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Executive Summary 
The Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) commissioned an impact assessment of its Western Balkans 
program from 2010 to 2015. As the team who carried out this assessment, our overall conclusion 
from the assessment is that the RBF program in the Western Balkans is having meaningful positive 
impact, and it is relevant to the developments in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and the rest of the 
region. We believe the program is well designed and is achieving a lot with a relatively small amount 
of money.  
The choice of the Western Balkans as a pivotal place is appropriate as it is one of the least stable 
parts of Europe. The four goals of the program connected to strengthening democracy, peace, and 
sustainable development in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia, are directly relevant to the RBF’s 
overall purpose as an organization and allow it to play to its strengths.  
The RBF should expect to remain engaged in the Western Balkans for at least another 10 years. 
The following conditions are indications that it could be time to exit this region: 
 All three countries have joined the European Union. The experience of Hungary
demonstrates, however, that this is insufficient in itself to preserve democratic practice.
 If the legal system, and political processes more generally, can bring the most powerful to
account and deal with impunity.
Contending with a political system based on impunity and patronage, as is common in the Western 
Balkans, will require effort on many fronts from many actors. Key areas that will need attention include 
ensuring rule of law/judicial reform, ensuring an independent media, and closely scrutinizing the 
management or privatization of publicly owned enterprises. In order to achieve impact in these areas, 
we believe the program should be more focused in the next five years.  
Considering the success of the RBF’s previous work in the energy sector, as well as the geopolitical 
headwinds in the Western Balkans, it is our opinion that the Fund should narrow the focus of its work 
on sustainable development to energy. Within this, however, we suggest expanding the range of the 
work to cover energy issues across the region.  
We agree with the approach of supporting nascent or less well-known civil society organizations 
(CSOs) to bring new life and diversity into the CSO sector. This has helped re-invigorate civil society 
in the countries where the RBF works.  
The civil society triangle concept, which brings together think tanks, investigative journalists, and 
grassroots organizations, can be a powerful instrument for attaining many of the RBF’s goals for the 
region. The RBF can make major contributions to the efforts of such triangles by using its existing 
networks and convening power to link them with international actors (international organizations, 
advocacy groups, think thanks, state actors) who can support their efforts. This may also mean 
working across different programs in the RBF.  
The RBF should continue framing the program around the countries’ aspirations to join the EU. 
However, it might be necessary to start promoting the goals in the RBF program, such as reforms to 
support accountability and transparency, as “goods” in their own right. Some fear that by promoting 
reforms purely as necessary for EU accession rather than as having intrinsic benefits for the country, 
the RBF risks not achieving its goals if it becomes clear that EU accession is no longer on the table. 
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Introduction  
Objectives of Impact Assessment 
The RBF commissioned a three-person team to carry out an impact assessment of its 2010–2015 
grantmaking in the Western Balkans in order to: 
 assess progress within Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo against the goals and indicators in 
the program framework; 
 give an opinion as to the relevance of these goals within the current context; 
 assess whether/how the RBF and its grantees contributed to this progress, or lack of it; 
 assess whether the assumptions regarding European Union accession are still valid and 
useful going forward; 
 summarize the key aspects of the approach taken by the RBF in its Western Balkans 
program and analyze the extent to which these approaches are working, as well as the 
lessons to be drawn from them; and 
 develop overall lessons learned and recommendations for the next five years. 
Methodology 
The methodology was developed in consultation with RBF staff and comprised: 
 an initial meeting of the evaluation team with key RBF staff in Pristina, Kosovo, to discuss 
and agree on the assessment focus and approach, leading to the development of a 
methodology paper;  
 a review of relevant documents including key external and internal documents (see Appendix 
C); 
 Skype interviews with RBF staff and board members, grantees, and external people; 
 field visits to Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Brussels to carry out individual and group 
interviews; 
 a three-day team analysis meeting followed by a preliminary feedback and discussion 
session with RBF staff; and 
 drafting this report.  
Overall, the evaluation was informed by 54 current and former grantees, six RBF staff members, two 
RBF board members, and 34 external interviewees. 
Challenges Facing the Midterm Impact Assessment 
The program is broad, complex, and ambitious, meaning that in the time available, the team focused 
on the big picture and was not able to look in detail at all areas of the work. In particular, it was not 
possible to have a full assessment of the overall impact against Goal 2 because of the following 
factors: 
1. We didn’t look at the impacts achieved by smaller CSOs that access funding from regranting 
by the foundations funded by the RBF.  
2. We were not able to access comprehensive data on the level of local contributions to the civil 
society sector. 
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3. We were not able to assess the final impact of areas of work such as Philanthropy for 
Green Ideas or, to an extent, the work of the Regional Environmental Center (REC) (Goal 
3), as it will take more time to show results. 
 
Additionally, we found the program framework unclear in places, and it appeared that the de facto 
approach had developed beyond the original framework without the full underlying theory of change 
being clearly articulated. Furthermore, the indicators in the program framework were not necessarily 
the best ones for assessing impact.  
However, despite these challenges, we were able to get a sufficient sense of the overall design of 
the program to draw conclusions and recommendations about its impact. We regret that time and 
space do not allow us to report in detail on all the initiatives that were shared with us. 
Context and Trends that Shape RBF Work in the Region 
Shared History and Issues 
The federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces formerly known as Yugoslavia started 
disintegrating in the late 1980s as a result of deep economic and structural problems. Nationalism 
had been on the rise throughout the previous decade, especially in Serbia. There, Slobodan 
Milosevic, a rising Communist leader, came to power using nationalism and a vision of a Greater 
Serbia that would include parts of Croatia, most of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, and the whole of Serbia, including Kosovo and Vojvodina. During the ensuing wars in 
Croatia (1991–1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995), and Kosovo (1998–1999), more than 
100,000 people were killed and millions were expelled in what became known as ethnic cleansing. 
Milosevic’s murderous streak was finally stopped by the U.S.-led NATO intervention in 1999.  
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Macedonia were recognized as independent and 
sovereign U.N. Member States already by 1993. Montenegro held a successful referendum on 
independence in 2006. Kosovo was a de facto international protectorate from 1999 until it declared 
independence in 2008. Aside from Slovenia, the countries of former Yugoslavia were left with 
overwhelming social, economic, and transitional justice problems—which they struggle with to this 
day.  
The Present 
Regional 
The three countries in which the RBF’s Western Balkans program is active—Kosovo, Montenegro, 
and Serbia—have many things in common. All three are aspiring EU members. Serbia and 
Montenegro have opened formal negotiations with the EU, whereas Kosovo has recently signed the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement. However, membership is a distant prospect for all.  
All three countries have strong executive branches of government with few checks and balances. 
The parliaments and the judiciary are either weak or directly controlled by the executive. Public 
administration in each country is heavily politicized, and strong patronage networks allow parties in 
power tremendous leverage over voters during elections, which are nominally free and fair.  
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Criminalized power structures are strong in all three countries and cooperate efficiently across the 
borders. Often, the organized crime networks are connected to—or controlled by—the intelligence 
apparatus, which was instrumental in organizing and committing the mass atrocities in the 1990s.  
There is little similarity in how the three societies interpret the events of the 1990s as well as distant 
history. The educational systems are exclusively focused on teaching one-sided interpretations of 
the wars, thereby ingraining dangerous, nationalist narratives into future generations. 
Civil society groups in all countries are operating under duress. Civil society in its organized form 
(i.e., nongovernmental organizations) is not necessarily viewed positively by the public. Most often, 
these organizations are viewed as foreign agents (especially in Serbia, as a consequence of 
Milosevic’s propaganda), special interest groups, or corrupt elites.  
In all countries, civil society groups are numerous and heterogeneous. However, a number of 
organizations are inactive, existing only on paper. Among the active ones, some are truly 
nongovernmental, whereas others are linked strongly to government. At the start of the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund’s Western Balkans program in 2001, all countries had a cadre of well-established 
organizations, most of which were criticized for monopolizing the civic space and access to donors. 
International donors are gradually moving out of the region,1 and that trend may well continue among 
bilateral donors, especially in the areas of democracy and civil society assistance. The attention of 
policymakers in the Western capitals is currently focused on the crises in Syria, Iraq, or Ukraine 
while the Western Balkans is now considered a third-tier issue. However, partially reversing this 
trend was the recent decision by the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation selecting Kosovo as 
eligible for grants.2 
Kosovo 
Six years after it declared independence and four years after it began taking over key institutional 
responsibilities from the international community, Kosovo held a bitterly contested election in 2014. It 
took the parties more than six months to agree on a ruling coalition, mostly because the country’s 
president and the Constitutional Court blocked the opposition three-party coalition from forming the 
government. Finally, the biggest opposition party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), decided 
to abandon Vetevendosje and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and form a ruling coalition 
with the incumbent Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), delegitimizing the government from the 
opposition’s perspective. 
The region’s laggard in the EU accession process, Kosovo finally signed a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with the EU in October 2015. Many commentators viewed this as a reward to 
the ruling coalition for participating in the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue in Brussels and signing a series of 
agreements with Serbia in August 2015. But the agreements with Serbia deepened the country’s 
extended political crisis after the Kosovar government acquiesced to give the Serb municipalities in 
Kosovo the right to be governed separately in many aspects. Kosovo’s President Atifete Jahjaga 
took the August 2015 agreements to the Constitutional Court, which gave them conditional approval. 
The opposition parties’ demands for greater transparency and accountability vis-à-vis the 
agreements are still ongoing. Over the last several months, opposition parties have set off tear gas 
                                                   
1 See for example, Adam Fagan, “Promoting Democracy in the Western Balkans after the Global Financial Crisis,” 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/LSEE/PDFs/Publications/Adam-Fagan-Paper-For-Publication.pdf  
2 See https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/release/mcc-board-selects-five-countries-for-mcc-partnerships-121715 
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six times in the Parliament in protest against the concessions that the Kosovar delegation made. In 
response, the government arrested a number of opposition leaders, further deepening the crisis.  
Civil society groups and media organizations in Kosovo are very active and have a strong voice in 
public debate. With considerable international presence on the ground, it is difficult for the 
government to silence critical voices. Think tank organizations in Kosovo are especially effective in 
getting access to decision-making processes and having their proposals considered and adopted as 
policy. Also, private and investigative media in Kosovo are in the best position of the three countries 
assessed. Although under constant political pressure, public service broadcasters are also more 
objective, and air shows that are critical of the government, such as Jeta ne Kosove, which regularly 
exposes misconduct in branches of the government. 
The United States is still a key international player in the country. The positive side effect of this is 
that the Kosovar government has to at least pretend that it is taking democratic practice seriously. 
However, on the issue of sustainable development, U.S. influence has not been entirely positive. 
Plans to build a new power plant, which the Fund’s grantees strongly oppose, have enjoyed support 
from the U.S. government because the investor is an American company.  
Montenegro 
Montenegro’s EU accession process has been progressing fairly well since the country officially 
opened negotiations in 2012. The NATO accession process is almost complete (as of March 2016), 
with Montenegro officially invited to join the organization in December 2015. 
Geopolitical interests of the EU, United States, and Russia are important for the country’s future. As 
a majority Orthodox Christian country, Montenegro has historically been allied with Russia. Hence, 
the decision of the government to join NATO is a historic exception and gives the ruling party 
leverage with decision makers in Washington and Brussels in other areas.  
Montenegro is the only democracy in Europe that has never had a transition of power. The 
Democratic Party of Socialists has ruled the country since the first multiparty elections in 1990. As a 
result, the political scene is extremely polarized, and informed debate often gives way to ad 
hominem attacks and smear campaigns.  
In terms of RBF goals, it is important to note that the government of Montenegro has agreed to 
participate in the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and 
other serious violations of human rights (RECOM), has taken some steps to address the leading 
transitional justice issues, and has agreed to transfer publicly owned property for use by the Civil 
Society House. Furthermore, the civil society scene is vibrant, albeit polarized. This polarization 
manifests itself partly in the opposition of one group of established civil society organizations to the 
Civil Society House initiative.  Despite this polarization, an emerging group of organizations 
supported by the RBF is beginning to cooperate quite closely and demonstrate impact (see Impact 
and Contribution of the Fund’s Grantmaking).  
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The Montenegrin government has repeatedly pledged strong support for building an “ecological 
state,”3 and has passed a number of laws and strategies that aim to support this vision; however, 
implementation is either weak or lacking entirely.  
Serbia 
Former far-right Serbian nationalists, today known as the Serbian Progressive Party, won Serbia’s 
parliamentary elections in 2014 by a wide margin. Since then, their leader, Prime Minister 
Aleksandar Vucic, has succeeded in gaining nearly complete control over the country’s government, 
economy, and the media. The opposition to Vucic is fragmented, and either very weak or has been 
co-opted by him.  
Under his leadership, Serbia has 
aggressively pursued EU integration 
goals, managing to convince the EU 
to officially open the accession 
negotiations without Serbia 
recognizing Kosovo as an 
independent country.  
Civil society in Serbia is less vibrant 
than Kosovo. A number of important 
organizations are well-established 
and working on issues such as 
transparency and accountability, but 
there remain many gaps, such as 
the lack of a serious and relevant 
organization focused specifically on 
anti-corruption.  
Russia is very influential in Serbia, 
having made considerable 
investments in its economy, especially in the energy sector, and fostered close ties with the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. In addition, there is a wide-ranging network of pro-Russian, right-wing civil society 
groups, which oppose EU integration. As a result of this geopolitical tug-of-war, coupled with a near-
complete government control of the media, Serbia’s pro-EU civil society groups face numerous 
constraints in getting their critical voices transmitted to the public.  
Peacebuilding and sustainable development activities are not high on the government’s agenda. 
Parts of the security apparatus rank and file have a vital interest in preventing the country from 
facing the past.  
Background on the Fund’s Work in the Region 
In early 2001, following a decade of war, the RBF began exploratory grantmaking in what was then 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia (including the province of Kosovo) and 
Montenegro. This work built on 20 years of experience in Central and Eastern Europe supporting 
3 The Constitution of Montenegro uses this term as a way to describe the country’s commitment to sustainable 
development. However, this verbal commitment is not really followed up with meaningful action.  
Directors and journalists marked BIRN’s 10th anniversary at a 
regional conference in Sarajevo in 2015. Photo courtesy of BIRN. 
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transition processes and helping to create conditions for that region’s accession to the EU. At the 
time, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was seen as a region of “special concern” due to its recent 
emergence from a decade of war and the potential for future regional instability.  
The initial funding was focused in five areas: building healthy democratic processes; supporting 
initiatives to overcome persistent ethnic myths and prejudices; encouraging a vibrant civil society 
and sustainable communities; promoting regional security; and assessing public and private sector 
options for international engagement in the Balkans. After nine months of working in the region, a 
change in program status from exploratory to multiyear grantmaking was agreed on by the board 
and the focus was narrowed to the first three of these areas with the main focus on “building the 
basic capacity for civil society to play a meaningful role in the transitional processes.”4 
In 2003, the program became one of the RBF’s three “pivotal places”5 within the new program 
architecture, where the Fund was to focus its place-based grantmaking. The Western Balkans was 
chosen as a pivotal place as it met the following three criteria: “particular importance with regard to 
the Fund’s substantive concerns; the potential for disproportionate impact on the future of its region 
and/or the globe; and special significance in light of the Fund’s grantmaking history.”6 It was also 
agreed that Kosovo should receive increased attention “as its political status at that time was 
undecided and it posed one of the biggest security challenges for the region and international 
community.”7  
The annual program budget in 2003 was $500,000, which grew to $2.1 million by 2009. During this 
period, Serbia, the largest country both by territory and population, received 45 percent of funding; 
Kosovo around 27 percent; and Montenegro, the smallest country, approximately nine percent. 
Although the RBF has focused work on these three countries, it has also supported work regionally 
and in other nearby countries as appropriate; this accounts for 19 percent of overall funding. 
The RBF demonstrated its concern over the future status of Kosovo in 2007 when it convened a 
meeting at The Pocantico Center to plan for Kosovo’s transition to independence in line with the 
comprehensive proposal for the final settlement of Kosovo’s status, known as the Ahtisaari Plan.8 
This brought together leading Kosovars, including representatives of Kosovo’s Serb minority, and 
international leaders. 
Program Grantmaking and Approach over a Five-Year Period  
Grantmaking 
The program in the Western Balkans was reviewed in 2010, and a new 10-year program framework 
was drawn up. This framed the RBF’s support around the region’s EU integration aspirations and 
adopted the first three goals below. Following the revision of the Fund’s Peacebuilding program in 
2011, a fourth goal, focused on peacebuilding, was added to the Western Balkans program to 
                                                   
4 Abazi, 2010. 
5 Pivotal places are chosen based on the opportunity for grantmaking that “cuts across and integrates democratic 
practice, sustainable development, [and] peace and security,” Stephen Heintz in his President’s Essay for the 2006 
RBF Annual Review, cited in Gaberman and Seessel, 2009. 
6 Abazi, 2010. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/101244.htm for more details. 
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highlight and consolidate the peacebuilding-
focused work in the program. The goals are now 
as follows: 
 Democratic Practice: Improving the 
performance, accountability, and 
transparency of government. 
 Democratic Practice: Building civil 
society capacity and effectiveness to 
strengthen participatory democracy. 
 Sustainable Development: Building a 
culture and practice of sustainable 
development. 
 Peacebuilding: Strengthening 
constituencies for reconciliation and 
enduring peace. 
The program has an annual budget of 
approximately $2.25 million. From 2010 to 2015, 
the Fund awarded 166 grants totaling $11.7 
million to 85 different organizations. An 
additional $700,000 was spent on RBF direct 
activities9 or conferences at The Pocantico Center, bringing the total expenditure over the five-year 
period to $12.4 million. A third of the total went to Goal 2, with Goals 1 and 3 each receiving 
approximately a quarter of funding, and Goal 4 receiving 12 percent (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Expenditure 2010–2015  
 Goal WB Program Funds % of Total 
Goal 1: Public Policy Development, 
Transparency, and Accountability 
$3,248,924 26% 
Goal 2: Civil Society Capacity and 
Effectiveness  
$4,399,649 35% 
Goal 3: Culture and Practice of Sustainable 
Development 
$3,094,918 25% 
Goal 4: Constituencies for Reconciliation and 
Enduring Peace 
$1,461,041 12% 
Other $234,234 2% 
 Total $12,436,178 100% 
 
The program focuses on Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo as well as supporting several region-wide 
initiatives. Kosovo has received a third of the funding, followed by Serbia, regional work, and then 
Montenegro (see Chart 1).  
In the period 2010–2015, 41 percent of the funding went to the three foundations (the Trag 
Foundation, the Forum for Civic Initiatives [FIQ] and the Fund for Active Citizenship [fAKT]), 
                                                   
9 Direct activities include projects that the Fund organizes directly, such as KOSID. 
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work on RECOM, the Kosovo Civil Society Consortium for Sustainable Development (KOSID), 
and REC. Parsing by grantee, 60 percent of funding went to 12 grantees and RBF direct activity (see 
Table 2).10 This left $5 million (40 percent) of funding spread among 73 grantees and meetings at 
The Pocantico Center; 29 of these grantees received one-off grants of $30,000 or less.  
Table 2: Main Grantees   
Organization Funding  
2010–2015 
% of total funding 
2010–2015 
Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern 
Europe (REC) (for work in Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia) 
$1,050,000 8% 
Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) (Kosovo) $1,077,740 9% 
RBF Direct Activity (Balkan Forum, KOSID, and Philanthropy 
for Green Ideas) 
$662,588 5% 
Trag Foundation (Serbia) $790,000 6% 
Fund for Active Citizenship (fAKT) (Montenegro) $790,000 6% 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (Kosovo) $578,000 5% 
The Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability 
(CRTA) (Serbia) 
$525,000 4% 
Institute for Development Policy (Kosovo) $405,400 3% 
Civic Alliance (Montenegro) $360,000 3% 
Humanitarian Law Center - Documentation and Memory 
(Regional) 
$357,000 3% 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Regional Network (Regional) $280,000 2% 
Partners Albania, Center for Change and Conflict Management 
(Albania) 
$274,000 2% 
Institute for Advanced Studies (GAP) (Kosovo) $250,000 2% 
Total of organizations receiving > $250,000 $7,399,728 60% 
The program currently has a full-time program director, Haki Abazi, based in New York, a full-time 
program assistant, Dragana Ilic, based in Belgrade, and a half-time program assistant, 
Karen Karnicki, based in New York, as well as support from other departments across the institution. 
Approach 
There are a number of distinct aspects to the way the RBF has been approaching grantmaking in the 
program, most of which cut across all goals: 
 The triangle approach: Grantmaking includes support for capacity building and collaborative 
work among think tanks, investigative journalists, and grassroots NGOs to improve the 
performance, transparency, and accountability of governments.  
 It has sought to support work at the grassroots, national, and regional levels simultaneously 
and to encourage linkages between organizations working at different levels.  
 From the start of the program, there has been a focus on grantee organizational 
sustainability, and the RBF has planned for what happens to grantees after its own exit from 
the region through a focus on capacity building, support for transition to EU funding, and the 
establishment of Civil Society Houses. 
 The program has been flexible in its grants and willing to fund core staff costs.  
                                                   
10 It should be noted that a significant proportion of the funding going to the three foundations is then regranted to a 
number of organizations; in addition, each is holding resources for CSHs. See text box, Civil Society Houses. 
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 There has been a focus on 
solving common problems 
across ethnic divides rather 
than on what divides people. 
 Grantmaking takes a long-term 
perspective. 
 The RBF deliberately seeks 
out and supports new civil 
society actors in order to 
promote diversity and 
independence within civil 
society. This includes a focus 
on youth. 
 The RBF has been an 
engaged grantmaker. This 
means it both enters into 
dialogue with potential and 
existing grantees about their 
approaches and strategies, but 
also is willing to take risks in its funding decisions by engaging in advocacy directly and 
doing some direct operational work. It has also helped establish new organizations.11 
 The program has actively looked for opportunities to draw on the expertise and resources of, 
and collaborate with, other RBF programs. 
Impact and Contribution of the Fund’s Grantmaking 
This section addresses each of the four goals that the RBF is seeking to attain in the Western 
Balkans including a brief overview of the funding that has been allocated, a recapitulation of the 
strategies that have been implemented, and a discussion of the activities that have achieved the 
most impressive impact. 
Goal 1: Democratic Practice: Improving the Performance, Accountability, and 
Transparency of Government 
Allocation for work to achieve this goal has been $3.25 million over the last five years (26 percent of 
the total). BIRN in Kosovo has received the most funding ($578,000), followed by CRTA in Serbia 
($525,000), and then Civic Alliance (CA) in Montenegro ($360,000). Collectively these three 
organizations received 45 percent of the funds allocated under this goal. Overall, Kosovo has 
received 41 percent of the funding under this goal, with Montenegro getting 23 percent, and Serbia 
33 percent. The rest was spent regionally and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (33 percent). 
This goal has three strategies: 
1. Enhancing the capacity of civil society to monitor the quality of public sector governance and 
service delivery. 
                                                   
11 For example, Slavko Curuvija Foundation was founded in 2013 with the Fund’s guidance to promote and support 
the development of free, independent, and accountable local media and the advancement of investigative journalism 
in Serbia. 
“Now there is less money, but we are 10 
times more powerful. In 2010 it was just 
people speaking up; now we are 
professional. We beat their professionals. We 
give them things they don’t know. … We are 
more effective because the quality of analysis 
is better. Our capacity has been built. … Now 
we have NGOs that are distinguished on 
topics they follow. [Five years ago, NGOs] 
were all doing the same thing. Now there are 
specialized NGOs on sustainable 
development and democratic promotion.” 
—Grantee (Kosovo) 
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2. Strengthening the investigative and educational practices of media and nongovernmental 
organizations. 
3. Strengthening the capacity of government and nongovernmental institutions to conduct 
sound policy analysis. 
These strategies are essentially about developing the capacity of the three components of the civil 
society triangle: grassroots organizations, investigative journalists, and think tanks. 
The individual components of a civil society triangle do exist and are functioning in all three 
countries. But their impact varies due to differing capacity, the degree of adversity within each 
context, and the extent and depth of collaboration among the components. It appears to us that, 
individually and collectively, the grantees in Kosovo are achieving more than those in the other 
countries.  
Kosovo Impact Achieved 
The Court Monitoring Program carried out by BIRN Kosovo, which is dedicated to using 
investigative journalism to hold the powerful accountable, in strategic partnership with its Justice in 
Kosovo (Drejtësia në Kosovë) television program, has directly contributed to the following fundamental 
building blocks of transparency in the court system:  
 The public announcement of court hearings in advance of convening (82 percent of the 
time vs. 0 percent seven years ago) and the appointment of information officers to 
supervise this function by the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC). 
 Use of audio and video recording equipment (for 85 percent of cases vs. 1 percent). 
 Use of courtrooms rather than judges’ offices for hearings (in 80 percent of cases vs. 27 
percent).12  
Accountability has been bolstered 
because the KJC now has its own 
monitors throughout the court 
system and, according to BIRN, the 
“Office of the Disciplinary 
prosecutor is competent … to 
initiate procedures against judges 
who violate the code of ethics, or the 
procedural rights of the parties.”13 
BIRN reports that “every month we 
are getting people fired.” Perhaps 
the greatest impact, however, has 
been to strengthen the ability of 
some judges to make tough 
decisions, thus confronting one 
aspect of impunity (see quote 
below). 
                                                   
12 Annual Court Monitoring Report: 2014, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network and Internews Kosova, April 2015. 
13 Ibid, 52. 
BIRN Kosovo’s Jeta ne Kosove organized public debates prior to 
national elections in 2012. Photo courtesy of BIRN Kosovo. 
13
The Justice in Kosovo and Jeta në Kosovë (Life in Kosovo) television programs also regularly expose 
misconduct in branches of the government other than the judiciary. Among the more notable 
instances of impact cited by BIRN are:  
 taping a citizen who reported a police officer asking for a bribe to remove a traffic ticket 
resulting, in the officer’s arrest and trial (the journalists won an award for the best anti-
corruption TV story of the year); 
 exposing that a member of Parliament and brother of a former prime minister, was serving as 
an external advisor to a private company, which led to his resignation from that position 
because serving in both capacities is in violation of Kosovar law;  
 revealing that individuals convicted by the Basic Court in Pristina were being released on the 
way to correction facilities, resulting in an investigation and change in the transportation 
procedures;  
 highlighting a violation of procurement law by a municipal official, resulting in arrest;  
 reporting that a contract for medical supplies with the Ministry of Health involved forgery 
worth millions of dollars, resulting in the arrest of the owners of the companies involved; and  
 exposing corruption in the education system involving three professors at the University of 
Pristina who hold the title “professor emeritus” without meeting the requirements.  
BIRN Kosovo won awards for anti-corruption reporting for the latter two stories.14 
BIRN’s strategic litigation program has succeeded in achieving a judgment against the prime 
minister that obliges him to reveal his travel expenses. This has served as an example to politicians 
at all levels that they can be held 
accountable (see text box, 
Strategic Litigation). It also 
represents a major transformation 
in the rule of law since 2009, 
when BIRN Kosovo’s executive 
director had her life threatened by 
the former Kosovo Liberation 
Army commander and mayor of 
Skenderaj, after she televised a 
program about his performance 
as mayor (see text box, Town Hall 
Debates Organized by a Civil 
Society Triangle). As BIRN 
describes the situation today, “Now the game is being fought more through the courts than through 
violence.”  
The Group for Legal and Political Studies (GLPS), which conducts policy research and advocates 
for democratization and the rule of law, supports the Parliamentary Committees on Legislation, Anti-
Corruption, and EU Integration in carrying out their oversight functions more effectively by producing 
annual work plans, gathering data, and producing annual reports that are presented to Parliament. 
                                                   
14 “BIRN Kosovo Wins Two Anticorruption Awards,” BIRN Kosovo, December 9, 2015. Available at 
http://birn.eu.com/en/news-and-events/birn-kosovo-wins-two-anticorruption-awards  
“After seven years of court monitoring we have 
judges calling us when they have a key decision to 
announce. If the decision is tough, they want 
media and NGO attention. For example, this 
happened recently in a murder case where the 
judge was dealing with the threats of the 
perpetrator. He announced a sentence and he 
wanted us there.” 
—Grantee (Kosovo) 
14
This has the potential to result in ministers being called to testify before these committees on their 
actions.  
 
The Brain Fund is a government-run initiative proposed by the Institute for Advanced Studies 
(GAP), a think tank that advocates for good governance and monitors the work of public institutions. 
The purpose of the Brain Fund was to attract high-level specialists to work for the government by 
paying them a supplement; however, in 2015 a GAP review of the program revealed that the number 
of people benefiting had risen from single figures to more than 200, with most not meeting the 
criteria. They publicized this abuse, received considerable media coverage, and succeeded in 
getting the government to withdraw the nominations. GAP was asked by the government to consult 
with it in preparing the subsequent list, resulting in the elimination of unqualified candidates. 
Strategic Litigation 
After years of exposing criminal misconduct by government officials on its TV programs with 
little response by prosecutors, three years ago, BIRN Kosovo adopted the use of strategic 
litigation to advance high-impact cases. This is a prominent example of “engaged journalism,” 
which actively seeks to promote accountability and bring about fundamental change. In the case 
of strategic litigation, the purpose is to transform a corrupted, co-opted, or cowed legal culture 
by pursuing carefully selected cases. Two cases have been undertaken by BIRN thus far.  
The first case resulted in the court ordering former Prime Minister Thaci to produce his travel 
vouchers. This is a landmark victory. As the head of BIRN Kosovo’s Legal Office remarked, “I 
believe there has never been a court in the region that has decided in favor of citizens and 
against some politician on the issue of transparency.” This demonstrates that politicians at all 
levels can potentially be held accountable. BIRN has also won the second case against the 
Kosovo Prosecutorial Council in the Court of First Instance directing the Council to reveal the 
names of prosecutors who have been disciplined for misconduct. The appeal will be decided in 
2016.  
Institute for Advanced Studies (GAP) has also undertaken two strategic litigation cases 
against the Ministry of Economic Development for their refusal to provide access to public 
documents used in the tendering process for the privatization of the Kosovo Electricity 
Distribution and Supply network. Additionally, the Kosovo Civil Society Consortium for 
Sustainable Development (KOSID), a consortium of Kosovo’s leading CSOs working together 
to advocate for long-term and sustainable solutions for the energy sector in Kosovo, has used 
strategic litigation with the World Bank in regard to resettlement issues relating to the proposed 
Kosovo Power Project. The outcomes of the GAP and KOSID cases are pending. 
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Traditionally, board positions 
of publicly owned enterprises 
were handed out through 
patronage. In order to 
address this, the Institute for 
Development Policy 
(INDEP), which focuses on 
strengthening democratic 
governance and plays the role 
of public policy watchdog, 
successfully advocated for a 
law prohibiting the 
appointment of anyone who 
has been in a leadership 
position in a political party or 
run for office in the last 36 
months.15 In 2015, they found 
that 10 nominees for these posts had lied under oath about their eligibility. When notified of this, the 
government claimed it didn’t have the capacity to check. After the government appointed seven 
additional politically connected individuals in violation of the law, INDEP went public with this 
information together with GAP and GLPS and also notified all embassies, along with the EU. As a 
result, the Kosovar Anti-Corruption Agency launched an investigation, the outcome of which is 
pending, but it could recommend a criminal investigation or revocation of the appointments. 
KALLXO.com (“speak out/do tell” in Albanian) is an anti-corruption online platform developed by 
BIRN Kosovo. Since its inception three years ago, it has received more than 4,800 reports of 
corruption, which is more than the government Anti-Corruption Agency. Of these, approximately 60 
percent have been found worth pursuing by BIRN. As a result, 70 cases have been filed with the 
authorities, and results are now coming in on average once a month (e.g., demotions or firing of 
government employees). According to BIRN, one indication of KALLXO’s success is that “All of the 
municipalities find the KALLXO tool so useful that they put it on their website.” Town hall debates are 
also a good example of impact at the municipal level (see text box, Town Hall Debates Organized by 
a Civil Society Triangle). 
                                                   
15 Law No. 03/L-087 on Public Enterprises. 
Rinora Gojani and Krenar Gashi of the Institute for Development Policy 
(INDEP) present their 2014 report on the state of media in Kosovo. Photo 
courtesy of INDEP. 
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 Montenegro Impact Achieved 
Civic Alliance (CA)—founded by a merger of 
35mm (a media CSO) and Youth Initiative on 
Human Rights—has 13 domestic NGO partners 
that work together to hold those in power to 
account, including exposing the abuse of prisoners 
and advocating for a new anti-corruption agency 
that will begin operations in 2016. CA’s most 
prominent initiatives are the TV program Robin 
Hud, devoted to resolving citizen complaints about 
government misconduct, and monitoring and 
following up on police brutality during the public 
demonstrations in September and October 2015 
(see text box, Civic Alliance, Robin Hud, and 
Monitoring of the Legal System).  
According to most of our interviewees in 
Montenegro, as a result of the work of CA, the 
public has access to unbiased information that is 
largely unavailable from the polarized media, 
which spins the news along pro- and anti-
government lines. 
Town Hall Debates Organized by a Civil Society Triangle  
In 2007, GAP, BIRN Kosovo, and the Advocacy Training and Resource Center (ATRC), an NGO 
devoted to community development and civic activism, combined their talents. They decided, with RBF 
support and encouragement, to conduct town hall debates in 26 of Kosovo’s municipalities prior to the 
municipal elections that year. GAP provided analysis of the budget proposals of the candidates. FIQ, a 
Kosovar foundation, enlisted its network of grassroots NGOs to recruit stakeholders in each 
municipality to be panelists and attendees, and to identify an appropriate venue. BIRN Kosovo 
televised the debates, and its founder, Jeta Xharra, served as the moderator. The purpose was to 
allow the electorate to evaluate the platforms of the candidates in order to make an informed judgment 
prior to voting. This initial exercise in popular democracy was characterized by extravagant promises 
from candidates that the winners were incapable of keeping. 
Prior to the next election, BIRN Kosovo returned to each municipality to reconvene the town hall 
meetings, play back the recordings of the elected mayors’ promises, and afford citizens the 
opportunity to question the mayors about their performance. In the subsequent municipal elections, 
the town hall debates focused on how to address the issues of greatest concern in that community, as 
determined by polls conducted by GAP. This contributed to a 50 percent turnover in the parties in 
power, the most basic form of democratic accountability. Another indicator of success is that all TV 
channels have copied this format, but the BIRN broadcasts remain the most popular. In 2014, they 
expanded the practice to include candidates for Parliament debating a wide range of different issues, 
among them how to improve the rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and transparency and 
accountability of the new governing bodies. 
‘The citizenry is not very active. 
People don’t believe that they can 
change anything. That is why Robin 
Hud is such an important show.” 
—External interviewee 
Civic Alliance’s Darko Ivanovic talks about 
establishing Robin Hud, with Bosnian civil society 
organizations. Photo courtesy of Civic Alliance. 
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 The Center for Democratic Transition (CDT) works to promote and strengthen democracy in 
Montenegro by developing and fostering public dialogue; training political actors; and monitoring 
government institutions, processes, and policy implementation. The CDT advocated for a law on 
political party financing that limits the amount of government spending during elections to a 
maximum of the average spent during the previous six months; this was successfully passed into 
law. The purpose is to prevent the incumbent government from increasing the number of public 
sector jobs and spending by the Ministry of Social Affairs just prior to an election, since every job 
that is doled out is considered to equal four votes. The CDT is also poised to monitor implementation 
of the law.  
Civic Alliance (CA) has graduated 14 classes from its School of Democratic Leadership for 
promising future government policymakers, media, and civil society leaders. One-quarter of current 
Parliament members graduated from this program, showing that this school has created a network 
bridging state and society. 
“What Civic Alliance did [during the October 24 
protest] was to provide citizens with unbiased 
facts with tweets. They provided accurate reports. 
It is a fact that there was excessive force.” 
—External interviewee (Montenegro) 
 
Civic Alliance, Robin Hud, and Monitoring of the Legal System  
Dedicated to addressing citizen complaints about government misconduct and malfeasance, Robin 
Hud, an initiative of CA, is one of the most popular programs in Montenegro. Over the past five years, 
the program, which is broadcast on public television, has addressed more than 100 complaints per 
year, with roughly two-thirds having been successfully resolved.* Robin Hud has accomplished this in 
part by mobilizing support from lawyers who provide pro bono legal assistance and in part by taking a 
problem-solving approach that tends to elicit a constructive response from government officials. 
However, if officials fail to honor their commitments, the program will follow up. Perhaps the greatest 
impact is that many citizens have begun to shed their apathy, phoning into the program because it has 
demonstrated that citizens can hold government officials to account. According to the U.N. office in 
Montenegro, almost 10 percent of the population has benefited from the program’s interventions in the 
last five years.† Additionally, the government has demonstrated a willingness to respond to petitions 
from citizens, at least when they are backed by the clout of a popular TV program. The U.N. office in 
Montenegro has recognized Robin Hud as a good practice “… acting as a service to citizens aiming to 
help build trust between citizens and institutions by efficient handling of their problems.” ‡ 
Robin Hud has also undertaken court monitoring, after the RBF suggested adapting BIRN Kosovo’s 
efforts in this regard to Montenegro’s circumstances. The critical first step was to determine through a 
survey what issues were of greatest concern to the public. This guided monitoring efforts to address 
excessive waiting times for trials and the common practice of judges and prosecutors consulting with 
each other prior to the trial. The latter practice virtually ceased, and 80 percent of judicial proceedings 
started on time by the end of the court monitoring program’s efforts. CA also established a 
con tructive working relationship with the supreme state prosecutor, the interior minister, and the 
police director by helping them comply with Freedom of Information Act legislation requirements and 
assisting with observance of human rights principles in the treatment of prisoners.  
_____________ 
* Lidija Brnović, “Accountable Citizens, Accountable Governments: Mapping Mechanisms for Participatory Policy 
Monitoring in Montenegro,” UN System in Montenegro, May 2014, 23. Available at: 
http://www.un.org.me/uploads/Documents/2014/Montenegro%20Mapping_Participatory%20Monitoring%20for%2
0Accountability_Report%20-%206%20June%202014.pdf 
† Ibid. 
‡ Ibid. 
18
These relationships proved to be crucial during the October 24, 2015 demonstrations that 
culminated in an attempt to storm the Parliament building. CA monitored and recorded the police 
response at the scene, had a representative in police headquarters who interviewed those arrested, 
and had access to hospitals, where CA representatives interviewed those beaten by the Special 
Anti-Terrorist Unit (SATU). CA’s real-time reporting via social media of the excessive use of force by 
the SATU was picked up by all the traditional media. Subsequently, CA received a video of a 
particularly egregious assault on a 60-year-old protester by 20 anti-terrorist police, which it used to 
identify two of the officers involved, leading to their indictment. In December, CA joined with five 
other prominent NGOs to demand that the police director and commander of the SATU be charged 
with complicity in this police brutality, and they appealed to the international community to make this 
a bellwether case for Montenegro’s ability to meet EU requirements for respect of human rights and 
the rule of law. Through these accomplishments over the past five years, CA and the associated 
Robin Hud public service program have established credibility with the public and a reservoir of 
potential energy for mobilizing support to hold the government to account.  
Serbia Impact Achieved 
Truth-o-Meter™ was established by the Center for 
Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA), 
an organization that aims to empower citizens and 
create opportunities for political participation through 
advocacy and government watchdog efforts. Truth-o-
Meter monitors the statements of politicians for 
truthfulness and fulfilling campaign promises. The 
information is shared on a webpage that gets 200,000–
300,000 unique visits per month (see text box, CRTA’s 
Istinomer [Truth-o-Meter]).  
Transparency of the legislative branch has been 
advanced by the Open Parliament Initiative sponsored 
by CRTA. Working in cooperation with Parliament, 
CRTA has ensured that parliamentary transcripts, voting 
records, and bills since 1997 are now available online. 
Some committees have live streams. A 
parliamentary group for Open Parliament has also 
started to institutionalize cooperation between civil 
society and Parliament.  
In 2015, CRTA published the budgets of 10 Serbian 
municipalities at their Data Center portal, rendering 
their spending transparent to journalists, activists, 
researchers, and the public. They also trained 10 
local CSO partners on how to research budget 
information and develop budget advocacy 
campaigns aimed at resolving budget issues in their 
communities. Although this initiative is nascent, it 
has already resulted in a proposal to fund a local 
ombudsman that is being considered by a municipal 
assembly.  
The Center for Research, Transparency, and 
Accountability’s Truth-o-Meter election debate was 
held in Nis, Serbia, in 2012. Photo courtesy of the 
Center for Research, Transparency, and 
Accountability. 
“Arandjelovac Equestrian 
Foundation is a good example. 
They started from scratch 
organizing seminars, etc. They 
no longer wait for donors to do 
things. They engage with 
citizens. As a result they raised 
the level of trust in civil society 
which suffers from extremely 
low level of public trust.” 
—Grantee (Serbia) 
19
Mikro Art, a think tank that connects activists, socially engaged artists, architects, and citizens on 
issues of urban development and resources management, and CRTA have focused on issues of 
public access to, and use of, publicly owned property. This has helped to bring a number of issues 
into the public domain, including the Belgrade Waterfront Development, where they have 
successfully mobilized people to demonstrate. These are significant achievements given the 
effective suppression of the media in Serbia.16  
                                                   
16 Herbert Wright, “Belgrade Waterfront: An unlikely place for Gulf petrodollars to settle”, The Guardian, December 
10, 2015. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/dec/10/belgrade-waterfront-gulf-petrodollars-exclusive-
waterside-development 
CRTA’S Istinomer (Truth-o-Meter) 
One successful approach to creating a demand for transparency in Serbia is CRTA's Istinomer, which 
was the region’s first fact-checking website. Inspired by the Pulitzer Prize-winning Politifact in the 
United States, which fact-checks statements by leading politicians and rates them on the world-
famous Truth-o-Meter™, a group of civic and political activists brought together by the NGO Linet 
launched Istinomer in the fall of 2009. The Washington-based National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED), already a Linet donor, provided seed funding for the site and remains a steady donor.  
The idea of tracking and rating the veracity and consistency of politicians’ statements and promises 
was a novel one in the region, and it quickly spread. Today, every country in the Western Balkans has 
its own version of Istinomer. The sites are networked into a regional coalition of organizations using 
information communication technology to promote political accountability and most, including 
Istinomer, are also members of a global fact-checking network led by the Poynter Institute, the owner 
of Politifact.  
Having realized the potential of fact-checking for promoting political accountability and transparency, 
Istinomer founders decided to rebrand their organization into what is today known as the Center for 
Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA). The RBF awarded CRTA its first institutional 
grant in 2010, allowing the organization to further develop both its online and offline activities around 
Istinomer. In fact, RBF funding was instrumental in allowing CRTA not only to maintain a steady public 
presence, but also to position Istinomer as a go-to reference point for politicians’ performance, 
especially ahead of elections. Building on NED funding, CRTA used RBF funds to introduce Istinomer 
election debates and, later, video versions of selected fact-checks, both of which remain highly 
popular. 
For several years, Istinomer was featured weekly in print by Serbia’s most circulated daily, Blic. 
However, Blic decided to stop featuring Istinomer ahead of elections in 2012, most likely under 
government pressure. As is the case with most other civil society groups, CRTA relied mostly on its 
online presence to transmit its findings to the public. Most recently, however, CRTA was invited to 
produce a short video version of Istinomer to be aired weekly by the leading regional television station, 
N1—an arrangement that is bound to increase the sites’ usage and visibility. 
Despite the narrow media space it has received over the years, Istinomer has become tremendously 
influential. Leading politicians regularly reference it during their statements, and party representatives 
are eager to participate in the Istinomer election debates. Perhaps the highlight of Istinomer’s 
watchdog and advocacy activities was its campaign to spotlight the lack of accountability by Serbia’s 
Minister of Education, who refused to annul the results of a standardized college entrance exam after 
it was made public that the test answer keys were leaked and used by numerous high school students 
in the summer of 2013. Istinomer’s online and offline campaign, using satire backed by facts to create 
public pressure demanding accountability for the leak, led to the minister’s eventual dismissal in the 
ensuing government reshuffling. 
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Goal 2: Democratic Practice: Building Civil Society Capacity and Effectiveness to 
Strengthen Participatory Democracy 
This is the largest area of investment, with $4.4 million having been allocated to work to achieve this 
goal during 2010–2015 (35 percent of the total). $2.7 million17 of this (60 percent of allocation on this 
goal and a fifth of the overall program allocation) has been allocated to three foundations: Trag 
Foundation in Serbia, Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) in Kosovo, and Fund for Active 
Citizenship (fAKT) in Montenegro. The RBF considers this a strategic use of funds given the role 
that the foundations play in supporting other civil society 
organizations in their respective countries. $1,260,000 of this is 
intended for setting up Civil Society Houses,18 and $173,000 went 
to specific projects.19 Of the remainder, between 34 and 95 
percent20 goes to regranting, depending on the organization, 
including to organizations located outside the capital cities, thus 
extending the RBF’s geographic reach. A further $274,000 was 
allocated to Partners Albania for work on Philanthropic 
Development (including Philanthropy for Green Ideas). The rest 
was allocated to a number of other organizations for a range of 
work including supporting journalists in Serbia (Slavko Curuvija 
Foundation); gifted and talented children in Kosovo 
(ENCOMPASS); and university-level students from the Roma, 
Ashkali, and Egyptian communities in Kosovo (Kosovo Agency 
for Advocacy and Development).  
                                                   
17 This doesn’t include $15,000 Trag reports it received in 2015 for flood relief as this was not included in the 
database of grants we received. 
18 $420,000 has been awarded to each foundation for establishing Civil Society Houses. 
19 $70,000 for Trag, and $103,000 for FIQ. 
20 fAKT calculates that approximately 95 percent of the general support grants it got from the RBF go to regranting. 
For Trag, it is 42 percent, and for FIQ, 34 percent. 
Civil Society Houses 
According to the Grant 
Docket, Civil Society 
Houses are intended to be 
“shared spaces and resource 
centers for civil society 
organizations. In addition to 
providing a physical home for 
civil society organizations, 
Civil Society Houses will 
serve as centers for 
connection, collaboration, 
and coordination for civil 
society within each country 
and between countries, 
including other countries in 
the region. The houses will 
nurture civil society 
organizations working to 
promote equality, justice, 
human rights, democratic 
values, and sustainable 
development and provide 
expertise and demand 
accountability to ensure the 
successful completion of 
European Union and Euro-
Atlantic integration. 
Furthering sustainable 
development goals, the 
houses will be designed to 
reflect sustainable urban 
planning, be energy efficient, 
and use clean energy.” 
Stephen Heintz and Jelena Curuvija at the launch of the Slavko 
Curuvija Foundation on March 28, 2014. Ms. Curuvija founded the 
organization in memory of her father, a journalist who was 
assassinated in 1999. Photo courtesy of the Slavko Curuvija 
Foundation. 
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In our opinion, the idea of achieving the goal across the 
whole of civil society with the resources available is 
unrealistic; however, in practice, work toward the goal has 
not focused on everything, but on the following two 
strategies: 
1. Strengthening the organizational and financial
capacity of the civic sector.
2. Stimulating indigenous philanthropy and solidarity
in society.
This is happening in the following ways: 
 Supporting three foundations, one in each country,
in order to ensure that grassroots organizations
have a sustainable source of support and funding
through regranting, training in fundraising, and other means.
 Working to increase the funding available for grassroots organizations into the future by
promoting philanthropy.
 Promoting solidarity through supporting examples of what can be done when people come
together to take collective action either through civil society organizations or through
organizations based on the principle of social entrepreneurship (see quote above).
 Some work on the legal framework around tax incentives for giving to charitable
organizations.
The three foundations have been making grants to grassroots organizations and now appear to have 
the capacity to continue the regranting work effectively into the future. This is demonstrated by their 
success in accessing funding from other donors, most notably the EU, to continue this work.21 Since 
2010, fAKT has made 79 grants with RBF funds and 244 in total, with a value of €1.2 million.22 The 
RBF is one of the donors that supported fAKT to become an autonomous organization in 
Montenegro,23 rather than an office of the Balkan Community Initiatives Fund (now the Trag 
Foundation), and according to fAKT, the RBF’s approach allows them to be “very responsive to 
local needs and context.” FIQ has made grants with RBF funds to 29 organizations, with a total 
amount of €127,000, and Trag Foundation made 47 grants. 
The foundations also support their grantee organizations beyond funding. For example, Trag 
provides technical grants and support to build capacity through training in how to mobilize local 
resources and raise funds, and incentivizes this through matched funding. Between 2010 and 2014, 
they supported 60 CSOs with technical grants of $101,000, with which the CSOs raised a total of 
$246,000 that Trag then matched with $304,000.24 Trag also provides technical support and 
21 For example Trag receives money for regranting from the Cooperative Netherlands Foundations, Mott Foundation, 
Balkan Trust for Democracy, USAID/Institute for Sustainable Communities, EU, and Oak Foundation. Full details can 
be found in Appendix D. 
22 Examples of initiatives funded by fAKT regranting can be seen at NGO GREEN.ME; Friends of kindergarten Djina 
Vrbica, Podgorica; Non-formal group of youth Bijelo Polje; NGO: Humanitarian Niksic; NGO “To vivify village” Pljevlja; 
Healthy Food Production, Niksic; Association of Parents of Montenegro, Podgorica 
23 fAKT was registered in 2008. See http://eng.faktcg.org/about-us/history-of-fakt/  
24 For more details, see Appendix D. 
“What we are trying to do … 
is promote entrepreneurship 
climate and cooperation at a 
small scale. To build 
communities that are not 
around an NGO, workshop or 
initiative imposed by some 
international donor. It is 
good that it is bottom up.” 
—Grantee (Macedonia) 
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incentives to build local partnerships to develop local philanthropy. In addition, Trag is working on 
building up its own endowment to ensure sustainability of its grantmaking.  
Promoting philanthropy has 
largely been pursued through 
two high-profile initiatives: 
Philanthropic awards (see quote 
to the left) and, to some extent, 
Philanthropy for Green Ideas. 
Over time, the philanthropy 
awards in each country have 
developed new categories to 
recognize businesses, 
individuals, and diaspora.25 
Feedback on these awards is 
very positive. According to 
people we interviewed, the 
awards are regarded as the most 
prestigious in each country, and 
the foundations report that 
generally, philanthropy appears 
to be on the rise. Our interviews 
suggested that, as well as raising the profile of philanthropy, these awards are helping to make 
giving more strategic. They are also reported to have led to other similar awards. For example, the 
philanthropy award in Serbia, VIRTUS, was reported by an external interviewee to have increased 
“the awareness of the wider stakeholder community—private sector and relevant organizations—of 
how important corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate philanthropy are.” According to 
the interviewee, three other organizations decided to establish yearly awards as a result.26 
For the last few years, Trag has been successful in covering the cost of the VIRTUS award from 
funds from other donors such as the EU, the Balkan Trust for Democracy, and USAID. 
The Philanthropy for Green Ideas 
competition and some direct RBF grants are 
providing examples of ways of organizing for 
social benefit that are not necessarily 
dependent on external donors in the long run, 
for example, grassroots initiatives that 
encourage solidarity though social 
entrepreneurship (see text box, Philanthropy 
for Green Ideas).  
                                                   
25 For example FIQ now awards prizes for: contribution at the national level (for companies); contribution of SMEs 
(small and medium enterprises); individual contribution; contribution from abroad (businesses, individuals from the 
Diaspora CSOs); innovation (businesses, individuals, CSOs); and better awareness campaign (businesses, 
individuals, CSOs). 
26 A National CSR Award by the Serbian Chamber of Commerce; Aurea, the best investment award (which takes 
account of CSR), and a special award for CSR contribution by local media, E-kapija; and an award for CSR 
Partnership and for Corporate Volunteering by Corporate Social Responsibility Forum. 
“This will be the ninth year that this was 
awarded. Competition is very intensive and many 
big companies apply. We see local companies as 
agents of philanthropy in local communities. 
They often don’t have a strategic approach to 
giving but are getting there. Last year a company 
gave one percent of their total income to an anti-
trafficking organization. Their core business is in 
construction material. There is a lot of forced 
labor in the construction business so they wanted 
to be involved in that. They are also sharing 
leaflets about the problem of trafficking.” 
—Grantee (Serbia) 
“For example, a guy gives money to 
the local sports club. Then he hears 
about VIRTUS and he thinks about 
transferring money in a different 
direction—towards the marginalized 
groups. This is clear impact.” 
—External interviewee (Serbia) 
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A study commissioned by the RBF in 201427 concluded that, in general, there is an enabling legal 
framework for the establishment and operation of foundations. For civil society more generally, 
according to USAID’s Civil Society Sustainability Index, there has been a very slight—almost 
negligible—improvement in NGO sustainability between 2010 and 2014 in Montenegro and Serbia, 
with it remaining the same in Kosovo.28 
                                                   
27 The Operating Environment for Public-Benefit Foundations in the Western Balkans Region (2014) European 
Foundation Centre. 
28 USAID, 2014. The 2014 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/EuropeEurasia_FY2014_CSOSI_Report.pdf#page=120 
Philanthropy for Green Ideas  
Philanthropy for Green Ideas is a regional competition that the RBF initiated in 2012 to 
encourage individuals and groups to establish socially responsible small businesses utilizing local 
resources in an environmentally friendly way. The idea arose after an RBF forum on the 
development of local philanthropy held at The Pocantico Center in 2010, where participants 
stressed the interplay of local resources and public trust on the strategic development of the 
philanthropic sector in the Western Balkans. It is organized by the RBF in collaboration with five 
foundations in the Western Balkans: Partners Albania, Forum for Civic Initiatives in Kosovo, 
ARNO in Macedonia, Fund for Active Citizenship in Montenegro, and Trag in Serbia. 
Each country holds a national competition from which three winners are selected. These winners 
then present their ideas at a regional competition in front of international judges; the location 
rotates among the five participating countries. The three regional winners are awarded up to 
$10,000 to implement their projects. Winners at the national level get publicity, new networks, 
mentoring, and, in some cases, support to access loans from mainstream banks. 
Although there are clear benefits for the actual winners, the impact is intended to reach beyond the 
small number of participants as, according to interviewees, the competition also aspires to: 
 challenge the post-communist culture of lack of engagement or agency by developing an 
entrepreneurial climate; 
 develop ideas for new ways of engaging on civic and sustainability issues such as social 
entrepreneurship; 
 increase trust in civil society; 
 promote green ideas and change people’s attitude to local resources; 
 support micro-level social entrepreneurs and small scale industry; 
 have a multiplier effect on local economies thus reducing urban and international 
migration; 
 support the development of local philanthropy; 
 reduce dependency on outside donors; and 
 bring together people from different countries and ethnic groups to discuss issues of 
common interest and develop links.  
Thus the competition cuts across three of the RBF’s goals in the Western Balkans: supporting the 
development and sustainability of civil society in the Western Balkans, sustainable development, 
and peacebuilding.  
[continued on next page] 
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 Establishing supportive legal and fiscal frameworks for civil society’s financial sustainability remains 
an issue, particularly around tax incentives for giving. All the foundations supported by the RBF are 
involved in discussions on these issues, and Trag was reported to be a key actor in developing 
Serbia’s 2010 law on foundations.  
The competition has only been running for four years, and it is too early to assess it against all 
these aspirations. Feedback from those involved shows an enormous enthusiasm for the initiative. 
In Albania, an RBF grantee reports that there have been at least 10 successful businesses 
supported by the competition, and the government has adopted the concept of a start-up 
competition for sustainable tourism inspired by Philanthropy for Green Ideas: “I know they [the 
government] were influenced in setting up this competition by what we [the grantee] were doing. … 
Last May, with their involvement, we organized the same kind of competition for sustainable 
tourism.” 
The first overall regional winner in 2012, a couple from Berane, Montenegro, turned their house, 
which is more than 100 years old, into a small ethnographic museum that offers ecotourists 
accommodation and the opportunity to experience the traditional way of life in a mountain village. 
Another winner is Design by Pana an “Innovative, Creative, Ecological and Social Upcycle 
Company” in Albania. They use recycled material to create products and employ people from 
marginalized groups such as orphans, retired people and returned emigrants. They won the 
national prize in Albania and second prize at the regional level in 2014 and now employ 13 people 
and are “becoming quite visible in the country and in the region.” Winning was instrumental in the 
organization being established. As explained by founder Pezana Rexha, “We have begun the 
enterprise only because we have won the competition otherwise it would have been almost 
impossible to make the dream come true. Winning the first competition in Albania was amazing 
because with that amount of money we could make it possible to buy the first equipment. Winning 
the one in the Balkans gave us the credibility that this idea had a value and in the meantime some 
extra money to have a bigger warehouse and … some extra employees and equipment. To be 
honest I think that without those two competitions [regional and national] Design by Pana would not 
have existed nowadays.” 
 
Design by Pana founder Pezana Rexha directs the construction of a crib, using reclaimed lumber. 
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Financial viability is recognized as by far the biggest weakness in the CSO Sustainability Index and 
remains a significant challenge in all three countries.29 In order to tackle this issue, the RBF has 
started to support the establishment of a Civil Society House in each country for its major grantees 
(see text box, Civil Society Houses). There has been some progress here in that the Kosovar and 
Montenegrin governments have pledged to provide land free of charge; in Serbia, the land may have 
to be purchased.  
Goal 3: Sustainable Development: Building a Culture and Practice of Sustainable 
Development 
The program framework shows three strategies to achieve this goal: 
1. Contributing to participatory and inclusive approaches to the design and implementation of 
strategies for sustainable development. 
2. Supporting educational reforms to include sustainable development concepts and practices 
as part of curriculum. 
3. Introducing and encouraging energy efficiency and environmental protection approaches in 
economic and infrastructure development. 
Over the past five years, the Fund’s Western Balkans program has allocated $3.1 million to achieve 
this goal (25 percent of overall spending). This figure includes some funding for direct activities by 
the RBF on Philanthropy for Green Ideas, covered under Goal 2.  
Impact Achieved 
Strategies for Sustainable Development 
As far as we could ascertain, Serbia has not made a notable effort to develop strategies for 
sustainable development. In Montenegro, the Expeditio Center for Sustainable Spatial 
Development, which works to encourage sustainable, spatial development, has participated in the 
development of the 2005–2012 Sustainable 
Development Strategy. Also, it developed 
the monitoring mechanisms for the 
implementation of the strategy. In addition, 
it participated in the design of the 2015–
2030 National Strategy for Sustainable 
Development. Furthermore, Expeditio will 
help develop monitoring mechanisms and 
indicators. In Kosovo, we noticed some 
success in both energy strategy and 
ensuring that EU standards, including those 
related to sustainable development, are 
taken into account in other strategic areas; 
however, there is no overarching strategy 
for sustainable development.  
                                                   
29 Ibid. Kosovo Financial Viability is assessed to be 4.7 compared to an overall sustainability score of 3.8; 
Montenegro it is 5.0 compared to 4.0, and in Serbia it is 5.2 compared to 4.1. A low figure indicates increased 
sustainability. 
Expeditio participated in the 2015 PARK(ing) Day in Kotor, 
Montenegro. PARK(ing) Day is an annual, global event 
where citizens turn parking spaces into temporary public 
parks to promote civic engagement and creativity. Photo 
courtesy of Expeditio. 
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Education for Sustainable Development 
Over the past five years, the RBF has contributed $1.05 million towards work done by the Regional 
Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC) on education for sustainable 
development in the Western Balkans. REC is an intergovernmental organization that consists of 30 
member states and 18 branch offices. Its approach builds on the opportunities arising from 
educational reforms implemented through the process of EU integration. Experts from REC have 
worked in partnership with the Ministries of Education in Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro to develop 
curricula and materials relating to sustainable development. Seed money from the RBF has led to 
co-financing from the Ministries of Education in Serbia and Kosovo, as well as additional funding 
from the Austrian Development Agency. REC has had the following successes: 
Kosovo: A draft curriculum with associated 
learning outcomes has been developed in 
collaboration with the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology 
(MEST). Government support is indicated 
by MEST providing financial support to 
train teachers, preparing a teacher manual, 
and developing content.  
Montenegro: Inter-subject themes and topics related to sustainable development have been officially 
approved by the National Bureau of Education and made part of the curricula for pre-school, primary 
school, high school, and vocational school. Teachers are now obliged to cover key relevant topics, 
including climate change, in their lessons.  
Serbia: The national curriculum in primary and secondary education has been reformed to integrate 
sustainable development learning outcomes into each subject, and the concept of environmental 
responsibility has been integrated into the official school curriculum. Environmental protection criteria 
are now included in performance assessment indicators for educational institutions, and sustainable 
development principles are incorporated into indicators for assessing teachers’ professional 
development. 
Economic and Infrastructure Development 
Within this area, two topics stand out: energy and, to a lesser extent, urban planning. The work in 
the Kosovo energy sector by the Kosovo Civil Society Consortium for Sustainable Development 
(KOSID) has had considerable success and has shown significant spinoffs. KOSID has been 
successful in: presenting alternatives to constructing a new coal-fired power plant, demonstrating to 
the World Bank the risk to its reputation for its involvement, getting filters installed on the existing 
coal-fired power plants, and gaining approval for the energy efficiency fund concept. This work 
reflects a successful intra-RBF collaboration between the Western Balkans program and the 
Democratic Practice’s global 
governance portfolio, which 
has had impacts on issues 
beyond Kosovo (see text box, 
The Kosovo Civil Society 
Consortium for Sustainable 
Development [KOSID]).  
“RBF money is a core driver to attract 
other donors to the region for education 
for sustainable development initiatives. 
Without RBF funds it would be much 
harder to attract other donors.” 
—Grantee 
“Until KOSID came on the scene no one knew about 
EU standards—with KOSID every time there is a 
legislative decision we have forced government to 
clear the strategy or plans against EU standards.” 
—Grantee (Kosovo) 
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 The Kosovo Civil Society Consortium for Sustainable Development (KOSID) 
 
KOSID held a press conference about its opposition to the New Kosovo Power Plant in January 2016. 
Beginning in 2010, the RBF brought together a diverse group of Kosovar civil society organizations to 
discuss concerns arising from the plans to build a new coal-fired power plant, known as Kosovo C. 
Eventually, a civil society consortium known as KOSID was formed, bringing together RBF grantees 
INDEP, GLPS, FIQ, BIRN Kosovo, and DokuFest as key members. KOSID has developed a series of 
policy papers that spotlight potential problems with Kosovo C and present possible alternatives for energy 
security in Kosovo, such as renewable energy and energy conservation. KOSID has also engaged at the 
international level with the World Bank, the EU, and the U.S. Congress. As a result, the World Bank sent 
an inspection panel to look at whether its policies on resettlement were being followed. KOSID is also 
closely monitoring the World Bank’s pending assessment of the environmental impact of developing 
Kosovo C with the option of petitioning for an additional inspection of whether the project complies with 
the Bank’s environmental standards. Moreover, as a result of KOSID’s work, the government is now more 
aware of the need to consider international standards in relevant policies. KOSID’s advocacy forced the 
government to de-bundle investment in mining and Kosovo B and C lignite-powered plants, as it did not 
comply with the existing competition law; eventually, the package for proposed investment was withdrawn 
from the pipeline of privatization.  
All government ministers involved in energy issues and relevant members of the international community 
now participate in KOSID’s annual conference. 
In 2012, INDEP provided research and analysis to the Parliament’s Economic and Development 
Committee regarding the existing law on energy efficiency, highlighting serious gaps in both policy and 
implementation and offering concrete recommendations. As a result, the government appointed INDEP to 
the working group charged with drafting replacement legislation, and 12 of INDEP’s resulting 13 
recommendations were included in the new draft Energy Law, expected to be approved in 2016. The 
working group has subsequently published new research, including recommendations to establish an 
Energy Efficiency Fund in 2016. 
DokuFest runs an annual documentary film festival in the city of Prizren, which, with RBF support, 
includes Green Dox, focusing on environmental issues. DokuFest has been working with KOSID to 
generate dialogue and awareness on issues of environmental degradation and renewable energy in 
Kosovo through screening and discussing the film, The Kingdom of Coal, with high school students, and 
through showing films that address Kosovo’s emerging environmental issues in Prizren on television and 
in rural municipalities. It also trains youth on video activism. KOSID demonstrated the ability to mobilize 
public opinion by gathering 33,000 signatures in four days in April 2014 on a petition against electricity 
price increases, thus requiring Parliament to discuss the issue. KOSID has not yet succeeded in getting 
all the requests in the petition adopted, but it remains committed to pursuing the issue. 
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In Serbia, Mikro Art has 
focused on issues of public 
access to and use of public 
property. Along with other 
groups, including CRTA, Mikro 
Art has successfully raised 
public awareness on a number 
of issues, including the 
controversial Belgrade 
Waterfront Development30 (see 
Goal 1 for more detail). 
Likewise, Expeditio in Kotor, 
Montenegro, has successfully 
managed to get the public 
engaged on issues of spatial 
urban planning and new 
construction at the municipal 
level.  
Goal 4: Peacebuilding: Strengthening Constituencies for Reconciliation and 
Enduring Peace 
This goal has the following strategies: 
1. Supporting efforts to establish and disseminate the truth about atrocities and mass violations 
of human rights during the recent conflicts in the region. 
2. Contributing to regional initiatives that engage diverse states and communities in conflict 
transformation to create conditions for enduring peace. 
Since 2010, $1.5 million, or 12 percent, has 
been allocated to this goal. Although the 
peacebuilding area had a number of grantees, 
RECOM was the principle initiative supported. 
Impact Achieved 
The RBF has been supporting the Coalition for 
RECOM since 2009 as an initiative that 
cooperates across the region to face the past 
(see text box, Regional Commission for the 
Establishment of Facts about War Crimes 
and Other Serious Violations of Human 
Rights [RECOM]). The Coalition for RECOM 
has close to 2,000 members across the region. 
All of the governments in the region, with the 
                                                   
30 Herbert Wright, “Belgrade Waterfront: An unlikely place for Gulf petrodollars to settle,” The Guardian, December 
10, 2015. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/dec/10/belgrade-waterfront-gulf-petrodollars-exclusive-
waterside-development 
Mikro Art has raised public awareness on issues such as the Belgrade 
Waterfront Development. Pictured here is a protest against the 
controversial project in 2015. Photo courtesy of Mikro Art. 
The Humanitarian Law Centre collected signatures in 
Belgrade supporting the establishment of RECOM in 
2014. Photo courtesy of the Humanitarian Law Centre. 
29
exception of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have agreed to participate in the process 
of establishing RECOM—a regional commission designed to establish the truth regarding mass 
atrocities and violations of human rights during the conflicts between 1991 and 2001—and five of the 
countries’ presidents have appointed personal envoys dedicated to the process.  
The RBF also gave grants to the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (CEAS), a Serbian think tank, 
for work on security sector reform in Serbia. CEAS is helping to keep alive public debate about the 
continued employment of senior security personnel who committed mass violations of human rights 
in the 1990s. It has repeatedly published research that clearly shows the need to reform the security 
sector if the transitional justice issues are to be dealt with in earnest.  
Steps have been taken to 
establish a platform to enhance 
regional collaboration around 
shared sustainable economic 
development goals (Balkan 
Forum); however, we were 
advised that this initiative was too 
new for us to look at. There is 
also an emerging network, 
Balkan Green Network, coming 
together to advocate around 
energy issues, building on the 
success of KOSID. This is 
managed by the grantee Balkan 
Green Foundation, a nonprofit 
organization established in 
January 2014 in Kosovo to 
coordinate and work with regional organizations to advocate for sustainable development in the 
Western Balkans. 
The regional approach to the other goals also can have impact in this area. For example, in the work 
to reform educational curricula, REC brought together high-level officials from across the region to 
discuss common issues on sustainable development, something that would have been unlikely to 
have happened a few years ago (see quote above).  
Regional Commission for the Establishment of Facts about War Crimes and Other 
Serious Violations of Human Rights (RECOM) 
The Coalition for RECOM is a nonpolitical regional network of close to 2,000 civil society 
organizations and individuals that advocates for the creation of an intergovernmental body, 
officially recognized by all seven former Yugoslav states, that will take responsibility to establish 
the facts about atrocities and human rights violations committed within the Former Yugoslavia 
during the period 1991–2001. As such, it is the first attempt to have a regional truth or 
reconciliation commission and is notable for its bottom-up, grassroots nature. Considerable 
progress has been made in the process. Five of the seven countries in the region have 
nominated envoys to the process, and the final text of the Statute for RECOM has been agreed 
on. RECOM had gained written support from the presidents of two countries that haven’t 
nominated envoys: from Montenegro and the previous president of Croatia; however, recent  
[continued on next page] 
“We just had a high-level regional conference with 
the Ministry of Education in Montenegro … with 
representatives from Serbia and also from Kosovo 
sitting at the same table and discussing issues of 
sustainable development. Seven or eight years ago, 
they wouldn’t do this. This is an achievement for 
the future for sustainability in the region but also 
with regards to peacebuilding in the region. 
Through a neutral platform we can build common 
goals together, and build mutual understanding 
across countries.” 
—Grantee 
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elections in Croatia and Bosnia mean that discussions will have to start again with the new 
president in Croatia and the two new members of the presidency in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Since 2011, progress on establishing RECOM has been mentioned by the European 
Commission progress reports. 
The process of working to establish RECOM has also provided the following: 
 An exercise in deliberative democracy by providing a platform for discussion among 
various groups at the regional, national, and local level. More than 6,000 people have 
engaged in various debates, many speaking in public for the first time. This process has 
challenged the post-communist norm of citizens who are not used to participating or 
having their voices heard.  
 A process of consultation at different levels: community, national, and regional, and 
among community members, academia, victim associations, etc. 
 A space for networking and collaboration between different groups. Links have been 
made between formerly opposed groups such as victims and former combatants. Victims 
associations and human rights associations have also started cooperating. 
 Evidence-based challenges to ethnically divisive narratives that either overinflate or 
dismiss the extent of war atrocities. The initiative has published data on victims in Kosovo 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, according to RBF staff, have succeeded in 
“humanizing the numbers of the victims and eliminating the manipulation of the numbers 
that one side or the other would use for political games.”  
 The opportunity to build social capital. There have been cases where victims and former 
combatants have met for the first time. One grantee suggested that meeting face-to-face 
means that “people over time become more moderate and reasonable.” 
 The catalyst to establish new civil society organizations: According to members, 10–20 
new organizations have formed as a result of hearings in their neighborhood to offer on-
going support to survivors and victims or to advocate for the establishment of RECOM. 
Examples include Transitional Justice, Accountability and Remembrance in Sarajevo, 
and the Center for Transitional Justice and Democracy in Banjaluka. 
 An increase in public knowledge about transitional justice issues and support for the 
establishment of RECOM: Half a million people have signed a petition calling for it to be 
established.  
Despite the progress made by the initiative to establish RECOM, there is still a long way to go on 
getting the political elites and general population to accept that war crimes might have also been 
committed by their own side. One well-informed non-grantee expressed concern that “young 
people are becoming more nationalistic as they are only being exposed to one-sided narratives.”  
Grantee activists are concerned that their “capacity is not enough to be sure the politics will 
establish RECOM” and are looking to develop more external political support. Two years ago, the 
initiative to establish RECOM explored, with the RBF, the possibility of organizing a meeting with 
European institutions to discuss how to move the initiative forward, but this did not happen at the 
time as European elections were due. Three areas for future support were suggested by 
RECOM: 
1. Establishing and maintaining the commitment of the EU and other actors for Transitional 
Justice. This is seen as an area where the RBF could take a very active role. 
2. Recording the history of human losses, violations, locations of detention camps, etc. 
3. Maintaining the concept and need for RECOM and transitional justice in the public 
sphere within countries in the Western Balkans. 
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Emerging Issues in the Region 
Regional/Cross-Cutting 
Prospects for EU membership for Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro might become questionable in 
the next several years. Enlargement fatigue in the EU, coupled with the growing interest and 
influence of non-EU powers (Russia and Turkey), could lead to a more robust “Euro-skepticism” 
within the Western Balkans. Some fear that by promoting reforms purely as necessary for EU 
accession, rather than as having intrinsic benefits for a country, one risks a failing commitment if it 
becomes clear that EU accession is no longer on the table. 
Owing to the geopolitical rivalry between the EU and Russia, we will likely see a greater trend of the 
EU looking the other way to abuses of power by governments of the Western Balkans seeking to 
gain admission to the EU. The Kosovo-Serbia Brussels dialogue is one such example: The EU is 
likely to continue to reward both governments with leniency on fulfilling the accession criteria as long 
as they agree to keep the dialogue process alive.  
It will be extremely challenging for the EU to effectively exert pressure on the governments in the 
region to deal with the transnational criminalized power structures and change the prevailing political 
culture. Even if pressure was applied, it is not likely that the governments would be willing to take 
meaningful steps in the direction of accountability, considering the overlap between governments 
and criminalized power structures. Too great a focus on accession at any price can distract attention 
away from some of the deeper reforms that are needed to achieve real change. 
New lignite-fired power plants are in the pipeline in Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It is likely that the EU accession process will be the most effective tool for activists 
willing to oppose these projects along the lines of KOSID’s success. The involvement of China in the 
projects in Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is likely to create additional geopolitical 
complications for the sustainable development activists.  
Rapid deterioration of media freedoms in Serbia sets a dangerous precedent for the rest of the 
region. The need for donor support and international intervention in helping to preserve free and 
independent media within the whole region is likely to grow. Internet-based media will continue to 
increase in importance across the region, especially in Kosovo, where 82 percent of households 
have Internet access and 63 percent use Skype. One reason for this is the size of the Kosovar 
diaspora.  
As the EU accession process progresses, governments will have more influence on the allocation of 
democracy assistance. This will likely make democracy activists more vulnerable to government 
interference. RBF support will likely become even more crucial, and coordination with the funding 
efforts of private U.S. donors, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, Charles Stewart 
Mott, and the Open Society Foundations, could become even more important. 
Kosovo 
In the near to medium term, the debate in Kosovo will likely revolve around the question of 
independence and membership in international bodies, especially the United Nations. As things 
stand now, the only way for Kosovo to get full recognition is for Serbia to recognize it as an 
independent state. Should Serbia continue refusing to do so, it is possible that Kosovar Albanians 
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will become more open to the opposition parties’ arguments opposed to resolving lingering disputes 
with Serbia in order to join the EU.  
As the country moves closer to the EU, the rest of the international community’s presence will very 
possibly be reduced. The vacuum left could lead to the worsening of the media situation, especially 
given the low level of professionalism of public service media. Also, investigative journalism will 
continue to be heavily dependent on international donors since it is unlikely that it will be able to 
generate significant advertising revenue.  
The constitutional provision allowing civil society to force Parliament to put on its agenda issues 
raised in a petition signed by 33,000 citizens is a powerful tool that could be used again to force the 
Parliament to act.  
Montenegro 
2016 will be a crucial year for Montenegro’s democratic future. First, the country will become a 
NATO member. Second, there will likely be a parliamentary election shortly before that. Keeping in 
mind that historically there have been serious issues with the way that the elections have been 
conducted, it will be vital for the next parliamentary election to be fair and perceived as such by the 
opposition and the international community. Opposition parties, which enjoy about 40 percent of 
support, feel very strongly that the country should not enter NATO. If the election is not perceived as 
fair, we could see more violent protests, which could seriously destabilize the country.  
Russia has considerable influence in Montenegro. It has openly supported the opposition parties’ 
protests and issued public statements condemning NATO membership.  
Serbia 
Government pressure on the opposition and critical media outlets will likely grow. Having in mind 
that very few donors (except for small grants by NED and USAID) provide direct support to private 
media outlets, the space for voices critical of the government to be heard will shrink even more. 
Donors’ goals for the medium term in Serbia must be realistic. The best that can be hoped for in the 
next several years is that Serbia does not regress democratically, following suit with its northern 
neighbor, Hungary.  
Lessons, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
This section draws out lessons from the RBF approach in the Western Balkans that might be 
applicable to programs in another location, then looks at conclusions that are specific to the Western 
Balkans program. It ends by making specific recommendations for the next phase of this program. 
Lessons 
These are the lessons that we believe would be applicable to new RBF programs working in 
countries that suffer from democratic challenges similar to those faced in the Western Balkans: 
 When dealing with a political system based on impunity and patronage, as is common in the 
Western Balkans, change will require effort on many fronts from many actors. Key areas that 
will need attention include judicial reform/ensuring rule of law, ensuring an independent 
media, and close scrutiny of the management or privatization of publically owned 
enterprises.  
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 The civil society triangle concept, which brings together think tanks, investigative journalists, 
and grassroots organizations, can be a powerful instrument for attaining many of the RBF’s 
goals in these circumstances. 
 The civil society triangle concept works best when organized around a common issue (e.g., 
KOSID/energy) with organizations that have specific interests in these issues.  
 To be most effective, the civil society triangle concept benefits from the members developing 
a joint strategy focusing on how to collectively achieve impact. This strategy may include 
using approaches that expose misconduct, such as strategic litigation; ones that develop 
support, such as appealing to outside actors (e.g., embassies) or linking with international 
civil society; and ones that support those in government trying to do a good job. 
 The RBF can make major contributions to the efforts of such civil society triangles by using 
its existing networks and convening power to link the triangles with international actors 
(international organizations, think thanks, state actors) who can support their efforts. This 
may mean collaborating among different programs in the RBF.  
 Engaged journalism, as described in text box, Strategic Litigation, is an appropriate approach 
for establishing government accountability.  
 In countries that are working towards EU accession, compliance with Chapter 23 on 
Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom and Security of the 
acquis are important sources of leverage for RBF grantees to promote accountability.  
 A few of the RBF’s aims can be accomplished without using the civil society triangle 
approach. For example, where the issue does not challenge unaccountable power or vested 
interests, but where there is a need for capacity support or motivation. A good example of 
this in the Western Balkans was the work on integrating sustainable development into new 
educational curricula. Here, the governments in the region had expressed an interest in 
doing the work, and expert help was able to move things forward.  
Conclusions 
This section draws together our overall assessment of the impact and design of the RBF program in 
the Western Balkans.  
Overall, we conclude that the program is having considerable positive impact in certain areas and, in 
general, is relevant to the issues facing Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and the rest of the region. We 
believe that the program is well designed and is achieving a lot with a relatively small amount of 
money.  
The Relevance of the Program  
We consider that overall the program is relevant because of the following: 
 The choice of the Western Balkans as a pivotal place is an appropriate one as it is one of the 
least stable parts of Europe. 
 The four goals of the program are directly relevant to the RBF’s overall purpose as an 
organization and allow the organization to play to its strengths.  
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Cross-Cutting Conclusions 
 The program is framed around supporting the countries to meet their aspirations for EU 
integration. This will not happen before 2020 and could take considerably longer. 
 There are potential trade-offs in the process of EU integration between higher geopolitical 
interests, such as the peace process between Serbia and Kosovo or the refugee crisis, that 
may come into conflict with and attainment of objectives such as democratic practice, 
transparency, and accountability. For example, one political commentator told us that some 
EU Member states felt Serbia should be rewarded for its helpful posture on the refugee crisis 
by opening Chapters 23 and 24 in the EU accession process. 
 The four goals have the potential to be mutually reinforcing: KOSID, for example, emerged 
out of a focus on energy within the goal on sustainable development but has shown how 
work on decisions around major infrastructure projects immediately takes the work into also 
dealing with issues of democratic practice.  
 The concept of the civil society triangle is useful as a funding strategy to ensure that a full 
spectrum of different kinds of civil society organizations are operating.  
 The civil society triangle concept can be a powerful instrument for attaining the RBF’s goals. 
KOSID is the best example of this. 
 The program has put focus on ensuring that there is diversity within the mix of grantees in 
terms of kinds of organization, experience, and geographic location. 
 We agree with the approach of supporting nascent or less well-known CSOs to bring new life 
and diversity into the CSO sector. This has helped re-invigorate civil society in the countries 
where the RBF works, though there is some inevitable backlash, partly expressed through 
opposition to the Civil Society House proposal. 
 The program has taken a long-term perspective (initially, 10 years) and does not expect to 
see quick results. We consider this to be appropriate for the kind of work being undertaken.  
 From the start, the program has considered issues of the RBF’s exit from the Western 
Balkans and adopted strategies, including the Civil Society House, to plan for this. This is to 
be commended.  
 Civil Society House appears to be a good idea to give RBF grantees that comprise the 
components of it a sure location from which to work, the ability to coordinate their efforts 
because they are in the same location, and considerable cost saving on rent, and so forth. 
There has already been significant work done on planning the initiative, and it is intended 
that business plans will be done in the next phase of development. As yet we are not 
convinced that the Civil Society Houses are likely to generate income as envisaged in the 
grant docket, but even without this, we 
believe the idea has value.  
 Funding civil society based outside the 
capital city is also important for a number 
of reasons: to ensure that civil society is 
linked to the whole of society; to take 
advantage of opportunities for influence 
on democratic practice at the municipality 
level; and to support local economic 
development. Dokufest and Expeditio 
are both good examples of effective work 
outside the capital city. 
DokuFest, a documentary film festival takes place in 
Prizren, Kosovo, annually. Photo courtesy of 
DokuFest. 
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 Watchdog and advocacy organizations in civil society need to have a means to inform the 
public about their findings.  
 The media angle is very important. This goes beyond supporting investigative journalists 
(which the program has done very successfully) to also ensuring that journalists and others 
have access to mainstream television, radio, newspapers, and websites to achieve wide 
distribution of their stories. One possible way to do this is to either give direct grants to media 
or to buy air time for grantees in the mainstream media.  
 There is considerable concentration of funding in certain areas. Sixty percent of funding went 
to 12 grantees and RBF direct activity. This leaves $5 million (40 percent) of funding spread 
out among 72 grantees and finance for meetings at The Pocantico Center; 29 of these got 
one-off grants of $30,000 or less. As a result, we consider that, in some areas, the work is 
being spread too thin for impact to be achieved. Furthermore, there are some examples of 
projects where their contribution to the program goals requires a very broad interpretation of 
the goal, thus contributing to spreading the work very widely (e.g., ENCOMPASS and 
Kosovo Agency for Advocacy and Development, which fall under Goal 2, are said to 
contribute to the development of general human capacity as a necessary requirement for 
civil society capacity in the long run).  
 There is insufficient regional cooperation on issues of impunity and organized crime across 
borders. 
Conclusions on Strategies 
Goal 1 
The third strategy under Goal 1 includes “strengthening the capacity of government … to conduct 
sound policy analysis,” which the program is not actually directly doing, though there are indirect 
routes through which government capacity can improve. We do not believe that the RBF should be 
working directly with governments on this and would suggest that the wording of the performance 
framework be amended to align with the de facto 
approach. 
Overall, despite some examples of impact in 
Serbia, there remain questions about the extent 
of any improvements or whether grantees’ 
achievements are largely around keeping things 
from getting worse.  
Goal 2 
Goal 2 is too ambitious for the resources and time frame of the program in that it is worded to cover 
the whole of civil society and broad changes in culture (e.g., solidarity and philanthropy) that would 
require a lot of resources and time to achieve. The underlying intention and theory of change is 
implicit and has emerged from discussions rather than being explicit. We understand the goal to be 
about strengthening the sustainability of the civic sector as a vital part of a healthy democracy. In the 
last five years, the work under this goal has focused on the two strategies: work on the legal 
framework and the development of philanthropy—with more emphasis on the second of these.  
Our discussions did not find that the legal framework, per se, is the major issue facing civil society, 
although implementation remains a challenge and the framework for philanthropy is weak. The three 
foundations that the RBF supports have been working on this area and should continue to do so. 
“Imagine a frozen lake. Skate on it 
and you only leave traces. As far 
as civil society goes, Serbia is a 
big, dark mess below the surface 
that we can’t reach.” 
—Grantee (Serbia) 
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The legal framework for philanthropy could be improved, particularly around tax incentives for giving, 
and all the foundations are working on this.  
There is a key issue pertaining to money for civil society that is administered by the government, 
some of this coming from the EU, with many CSOs complaining this is not allocated transparently.  
Promoting philanthropy works to the RBF’s strengths as an organization founded by the 
Rockefellers.  
Goal 3 
Building a culture and practice of sustainable development is also very ambitious, and we believe 
that more could be achieved by focusing on a limited number of areas within this issue. We are not 
convinced that focusing on the development of a national-level sustainable development strategy, 
the first strategy under this goal in the program framework, is the best use of effort. Adopting a 
strategy in this context doesn’t necessarily mean that it will be implemented. Instead, we suggest 
that the entry point should be a focus on energy (see Recommendations). We are not suggesting 
that the RBF stops supporting work 
such as that done by Expeditio and 
Mikro Art, as this appears to be having 
impact. However, core to this work are 
issues of democratic practice, and 
accountability and transparency 
pertaining to the use of public spaces, 
thus it could as appropriately fall under 
Goal 1.  
The second strategy to date has focused on the curriculum for sustainable development where work 
to incorporate these issues into curricula is close to completion in all three countries. We were not 
able to evaluate the impact of the changes in curricula in terms of changing behaviors as this will 
require more time; however, given the relatively small amount of money invested compared to the 
potential final impact (the curricula will be there for some years and reach many children), it appears 
to be good value for the money.  
We believe that the approach adopted towards introducing and encouraging energy efficiency and 
environmental protection approaches in economic and infrastructure development, through looking at 
the energy sector, is a strategic one, and that KOSID is the clear example of impact toward this goal.  
We believe that one of the reasons KOSID has been so effective is that it focuses on one particular 
aspect of sustainable development: coal-fired power plants and alternatives to that. If the RBF were 
to try to support grantees to pursue the whole spectrum of sustainable development, there is a risk it 
would spread its support too thinly.  
The creation of a position in Washington and facilitating links with organizations in the United States 
has been extremely important for KOSID. KOSID has also been a good example of different parts of 
RBF working together and developing synergy between their different programs. 
For the future, it will be important to take account of the need for energy security and the 
environment to be addressed at a regional level. 
“Within the broader educational reforms 
which happen as part of the EU integration 
process … doors are already open and with 
a small sum of money you can have a big 
impact.” 
—Grantee 
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In our opinion, some projects that are funded under this goal do not appear to contribute to achieving 
what is in the program framework or fit well under this strategy. This will particularly be the case if it 
becomes more focused as we are recommending. Although the RBF cites the Optimist 
Association and Fenomena as examples of small-scale projects intended to encourage the culture 
and practice of sustainability that could be replicated elsewhere, our discussions with them 
suggested that the impetus of the work they did with RBF grants was focused mainly around their 
sustainability as organizations, and thus we believe that they would be more appropriately funded 
under Goal 2. 
Goal 4 
We agree with the overall approach to Goal 4. The first strategy of supporting efforts to establish and 
disseminate the truth about atrocities and mass violations of human rights during the years of conflict 
in the region has been done largely through supporting members of the Coalition to Establish 
RECOM, which we consider to be appropriate.  
The actual approach to engaging diverse states and communities has been to involve them in 
discussions around common interests rather than focusing on issues around conflict. This would 
appear to be a suitable approach to peacebuilding in the context.  
Conclusions on the RBF’s Approach to Grantmaking 
The RBF’s approach to grantmaking is something that the grantees appreciate: 
 The RBF’s flexible funding, in particular when it gives institutional rather than project grants, 
maximizes the utility of the funds as it allows organizations to respond to issues as they 
arise. This kind of funding is hard to come by and particularly important in the current political 
context where things are changing very fast. 
 The RBF is noted as a donor that does not impose onerous conditions but does challenge 
grantees as to their approach in a constructive way, in particular around how grantees will 
achieve impact and how they might work collectively with others. It acts as an engaged 
grantmaker. This is valued.  
 The RBF’s flexibility also allows grantees and their partners to design work in a way that 
suits them and thus take ownership of it (see quote above). 
 Grantees value their long-term relationships with the RBF, but for those that are not currently 
supported by the RBF, it was reported by one external interviewee as generally seen as 
“hard to break into the inner circle.”  
 The RBF’s agility is also a factor in enabling it to identify and fund larger opportunities that 
respond to emerging conditions, at times working with specific partners to this end. The work 
with REC on education curriculum reform is a good example of this. Also, this allows the 
RBF to experiment and take risks, by supporting new and emerging organizations such as 
Mikro Art or being more operational than donors sometimes are (e.g., Philanthropy for 
Green Ideas and Balkan Forum).  
“RBF is one of the few organizations we feel as partners 
rather than donors. We build and do things together rather 
than ticking boxes.” 
—Grantee (Serbia) 
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 The RBF team in the Western Balkans has successfully managed to instigate cooperation 
and synergy among civil society actors. This is a very positive reflection on their ways of 
working, including identifying appropriate partners and interacting with them in an engaged 
and supportive manner. We believe the RBF has effective staff.  
Recommendations 
The following are the team’s recommendations for the next phase of the RBF’s Western Balkans 
program.  
Length of Engagement 
The RBF should expect to remain engaged in the Western Balkans for at least another 10 years.  
The following conditions are indications that it could be time to exit this program: 
 All three countries have joined the EU. The experience of Hungary demonstrates, however, 
that this is insufficient in itself to preserve democratic practice. 
 If the legal system, and political processes more generally, can bring the most powerful to 
account, and deal with impunity.  
Program Framework 
Our overarching recommendation on the program framework is that the program should be revised 
to focus more. 
We recommend that this is done by investing more in Goal 1 and on work on the energy sector 
in Goal 3. Funds for this increased investment can be found by graduating the work on curriculum, 
where we do not see it as the role of the RBF to fund roll-out, and by reducing support to the 
foundations for regranting as they are now successfully accessing funding from elsewhere to do this. 
Within Goals 1 and 3, the work should also be focused more in the following ways: 
 Focus Goal 1 on the work of CSOs (including grassroots organizations, investigative 
journalists, and think tanks) to check the abuse of state power instead of “service delivery” 
and “strengthening government capacity to perform sound policy analysis.”  
 Part of this should include looking at strategies to ensure that investigative journalists have a 
medium to publish to a wide audience. This is particularly important in Serbia. They should 
“One thing very good about RBF is its flexibility … [the RBF says they] will 
be flexible about activities if we achieve the results. This gives a lot of 
opportunities to do good work. It also means we don’t have to dictate to 
the countries concerned. Ultimately [the countries] decide what is needed 
for the countries. Because of this … [the countries] create ownership. 
When you have ownership by ministries and national institutions then you 
will have good results. If [the countries] feel it is just another project 
forced on them, you never have sustainability.” 
—Grantee 
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not only be publishing their findings on social media and the Internet, which are likely to grow 
in importance in the future, but also on television, which remains important at the moment. 
This may mean funding content to be shown, especially on television channels. It may also 
be worthwhile to support think tanks and others to consider how to make their findings more 
accessible to mass audiences—possible approaches include: linking with investigative 
journalists and media editors, and developing communication strategies or skills.  
 Focus Goal 3 more narrowly on energy policy. This has been very successful in Kosovo and 
has the potential to emerge as a significant body of work within the region. This is a key area 
to work on as: a) it is timely; b) it is an area with the potential for significant corruption; c) 
opening up the decision-making process on this kind of investment decision could have 
broader impact on decision making in general; d) it promotes EU integration; and e) it offers 
opportunities for leverage due to the role of international organizations and the engagement 
of international civil society.  
Working on promoting philanthropy is an obvious niche for the RBF, given its history, reputation, and 
convening power. We consider that, for the future, Goal 2 should be recalibrated to focus on 
two areas: the development of philanthropy and the long-term sustainability of the RBF’s major 
grantees. The RBF has adopted a promising strategy for accomplishing the second of these (i.e., the 
development of Civil Society Houses) and appears to have the resources to do this.  
The program framework should be revised to reflect our recommendations above. As part of this, the 
underlying theory of change should be clearly articulated and attention given to ensuring that there 
are appropriate indicators that focus on impact rather than activities. While monitoring and reporting 
on the new program framework, staff should specify the total amount invested to date in major areas 
of work so that strategic discussions can be had regarding the most appropriate balance of funding 
(e.g., total funds that have been invested in regranting, REC, KOSID, Philanthropy for Green 
Ideas, etc.).  
The RBF should continue framing the program around the countries’ aspirations to join the EU as it 
provides potential for leverage on the RBF’s core goals. However, the RBF should hedge against the 
possibility that the EU accession process may stagnate and become perceived as unattainable by 
also promoting the RBF goals of accountability, transparency, sustainable development, and 
peacebuilding as intrinsic “goods” in their own right.  
Funding Approach 
National 
Continue to catalyze, facilitate, and fund collaboration at the national level between different civil 
society actors to work collectively on issues of accountability, transparency, and energy with a focus 
on how they can achieve greater impact together. The intent would be to instigate functioning civil 
society triangles around these issues, if necessary.  
Strategic litigation, which has been used with notable success in Kosovo, has the potential to be 
used in Serbia and Montenegro. This can be combined with the EU judicial reform process to 
provide litmus tests that must be handled successfully if the country is to move forward with Chapter 
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23 on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24 on Justice, Freedom and Security of the 
acquis.31 
Regional 
Increase efforts to support cross learning and collaboration between civil society organizations 
working in different parts of the Western Balkans on energy and anti-corruption. This could be a joint 
effort with like-minded donors. There may also be further opportunities for networks to apply for 
funding from the EU. 
Explore the possibility of building on existing work that covers Bosnia and Herzegovina, and make it 
a more explicit part of the program’s future geographic focus as it is key for the transnational issues 
the RBF is working on (e.g., energy, regional stability, facing the past, and anti-corruption).  
International 
The RBF should support representation in Brussels to advocate for the position of grantees and link 
grantees with relevant decision makers in support of all four goals. This could be along the same 
model as KOSID’s consultant or EDI in Washington. The work should reach beyond European civil 
servants and members of the European Parliament to include linking with European think tanks and 
civil society.  
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Appendix A: Examples of Impact Against the Performance Framework 
Goal 1: Democratic Practice: Improving the Performance, Accountability, and Transparency of Government 
Approved June 2010; Review 2015 
Strategy Key Indicator of Progress in 3–5 Years Examples of Impact 
1. Enhancing the
capacity of civil
society to monitor the
quality of public
sector governance
and service delivery
Strategic collaboration among grassroots 
organizations, policy think tanks, and 
investigative journalists established in 
three countries (“triangle approach”) (C) 
Relates to strategies 1, 2, and 3 
Collaboration among the three components has been established in all 
three countries, but the extent of collaboration among the components 
varies. It functions most effectively in Kosovo. 
Government budget planning and spending 
is done with increased transparency at 
central and local levels (B) 
In Kosovo the ability of the Assembly to perform its oversight function 
has been advanced by the Group for Legal and Political Studies, and 
in Serbia, CRTA is making municipal budgets are more transparent. 
Increased public scrutiny of priority public 
investment areas (E) 
There are concrete examples of increased public scrutiny in all three 
countries (e.g., KOSID’s work on investments in the energy sector in 
Kosovo, BIRN’s work on investment in Serbia’s energy sector, and 
Expeditio’s work in Montenegro). 
Civil society plays active role in 
Europeanization of electoral law, political 
party financing, and monitoring the quality of 
elections 
Legislation has been enacted in Montenegro at the instigation of the 
Center for Democratic Transition that restricts the government’s 
ability to use public funds as a source of patronage (i.e., employment 
and services) during the run-up to an election. 
Country-specific networks cooperate across 
the region to work toward EU Integration (C) 
We did not find progress against this indicator. 
2. Strengthening the
investigative and
educational practices
of media and
nongovernmental
organizations
Public demands changes in corrupt 
behaviors as a result of investigative 
reporting (U,E) 
This is the metric where the greatest impact has been achieved in Goal 
1. In Kosovo, BIRN has provided effective venues for the public to
demand redress for corrupt government practices (i.e., Life in Kosovo,
Justice in Kosovo and Kalxxo). In Montenegro, according to the U.N.
system, Civic Action’s Robin Hud has assisted an estimated 10
percent of the population that has suffered from government
malfeasance. In Serbia, the public has been mobilized by CRTA and
Mikro Art to protest suspicious government use of public property.
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Judiciary more effectively plays its role (U, 
E, C) 
BIRN Kosovo has achieved exceptional success in its strategic 
litigation by gaining a ruling from the Constitutional Court that the prime 
minister must reveal his invoices for expenses claimed on travel. The 
court monitoring program that BIRN has run for seven years has also 
had a salient impact on the willingness of some judges to confront 
threats from dangerous defendants. 
3. Strengthening the
capacity of
government and
nongovernmental
institutions to
conduct sound policy
analysis
Participatory processes and expert analyses 
needed for sound political, social, and 
economic policies are in place (C) 
In Kosovo, CSOs have specialized in specific policy areas affording 
them a comparative advantage over the government that they are using 
to influence policy. In Montenegro, one-quarter of the Parliament has 
graduated from Civic Alliance’s School for Democratic Leadership, 
providing access for participation in legislative deliberations. 
Legislative, executive, and judiciary 
branches of the government develop 
independent positions supported by sound 
policy analysis (C) 
Goal 2: Democratic Practice: Building Civil Society Capacity and Effectiveness to Strengthen Participatory Democracy 
Approved June 2010; Review 2015 
Strategy Key Indicator of Progress in 3–5 Years Examples of Impact 
1. Strengthening the
organizational and
financial capacity of
the civic sector
Civil society has secured the legal 
framework to allow it to thrive and develop 
(P) 
The European Foundation Centre found that there is an enabling legal 
framework for the establishment and operation of foundations. TRAG 
was reported to be a key actor in developing Serbia’s 2010 law on 
foundations. 
Supportive legal and fiscal frameworks for civil society financial 
sustainability remain an issue, particularly around tax incentives for 
giving. Trag, FIQ, and fAKT are working on this. 
Measureable increase in the level of local 
contributions to the civil society sector (U, 
B) 
Data are not available for the overall level of local contributions to civil 
society. Anecdotal evidence suggests there has been some increase in 
all three countries. 
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2. Stimulating
indigenous
philanthropy and
solidarity in society
Indigenous foundation are fully established 
and operational in all three countries (C) 
The three foundations supported by the RBF (Trag, FIQ, and fAKT) are 
fully established and operational. 
Similar foundations have emerged in other 
countries, such as Albania, Macedonia, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (C) 
The RBF was a key influence in the 2013 establishment of ARNO in 
Macedonia. The RBF has also supported Partners Albania 
(established in 2001). 
Culture of individual and corporate giving for 
the common good established across the 
region (U, B) 
There is anecdotal evidence of a somewhat stronger culture of 
individual and corporate giving in the three focus countries. 
Goal 3: Sustainable Development: Building a Culture and Practice of Sustainable Development 
Approved June 2010; Review 2015 
Strategy Key Indicator of Progress in 3–5 Years Examples of Impact 
1. Contributing to
participatory and
inclusive approaches
to the design and
implementation of
strategies for
sustainable
development
All three countries adopt sustainable 
development strategies that are created and 
implemented with the participation of 
representative stakeholders from their 
societies (P, E) 
Montenegro has drafted a 2015–2030 National Sustainable 
Development Strategy. RBF grantee, Expeditio, played a very 
important role in the process and the Monitoring Mechanism was 
developed with Expeditio input. 
Serbia has not made considerable progress in this area. 
Kosovo still does not have a national strategy, but there is improvement, 
especially in the area of energy policy, thanks to RBF grantees in 
KOSID. 
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2. Supporting 
educational reforms 
to include 
sustainable 
development 
concepts and 
practices as part of 
curriculum 
Sustainable development is part of the 
school curriculum with government support 
(C, U) 
Kosovo: Draft curriculum with associated learning outcomes has been 
developed in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology (MEST). Government support is indicated by MEST 
providing direct financial support to train teachers, prepare a teaching 
manual, and develop content. (RBF grantee REC was directly involved.) 
Montenegro: Inter-subject themes and topics related to sustainable 
development have been officially approved by the National Bureau of 
Education and made part of the curricula for pre-school, primary school, 
high school, and vocational school. Teachers are now obliged to cover 
climate change, green economy, human rights, environmental 
protection, sustainable cities and communities, biodiversity, and 
environment and health in their lessons. (RBF grantee REC was directly 
involved.) 
Serbia: The national curriculum in primary and secondary education has 
been reformed to integrate sustainable development learning outcomes 
into each subject and the concept of environmental responsibility has 
been integrated into the official school curriculum. Environmental 
protection criteria are now included in performance assessment 
indicators for educational institutions and sustainable development 
principles are incorporated into indicators for assessing teachers’ 
professional development. (RBF grantee REC was directly involved.) 
3. Introducing and 
encouraging energy 
efficiency and 
environmental 
protection 
approaches in 
economic and 
infrastructure 
development 
Energy efficiency and environmentally 
friendly practices in place (U, B) 
There are some signs that the international initiatives are starting to take 
into account energy efficiency in Kosovo thanks to work of KOSID. 
Increase in citizens’ understanding of the 
benefits of energy efficiency; citizens begin 
to take action (U, B) 
Citizens are taking action on this issue in Kosovo partly thanks to the 
activism of KOSID members. 
International initiatives and processes 
support low-carbon economies and reflect 
the role of civil society (C, U) 
 
Global environmental advocacy institutions 
use lessons from the Western Balkans for 
successful advocacy in other regions (U,B) 
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Goal 4: Peacebuilding: Strengthening Constituencies for Reconciliation and Enduring Peace 
Approved June 2010; Review 2015 
Strategy Key Indicator of Progress in 3–5 Years Examples of Impact 
1. Supporting efforts to
establish and
disseminate the truth
about atrocities and
mass violations of
human rights during
the years of conflict
in the region.
Country-specific networks cooperate across 
the region to face the past (C, E) 
There are networks in all three countries that cooperate regionally on 
the issues. 
Governments formalize the process of 
establishing truth commissions (C, B) 
All three countries have signed up to participate in the creation of 
RECOM. 
2. Contributing to
regional initiatives
that engage diverse
states and
communities in
conflict
transformation to
create conditions for
enduring peace.
New platform to enhance regional 
collaboration around shared sustainable 
economic development goals among 
countries of the Western Balkans 
Regional energy initiative is the new platform which supports the shared 
sustainable development goals. 
Countries of the Western Balkans exchange 
knowledge and methodologies for 
preventing and transforming conflicts and 
supporting progressive leadership with 
similar regions (C, B) 
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Appendix B: Interviewees 
RBF Interviewees 
Haki Abazi, Western Balkans Program Director 
Anne Bartley, Trustee 
Betsy Campbell, Vice President for Programs 
Stephen Heintz, President 
Dragana Ilic, Program Assistant 
Tom Kruse, Global Governance Program Director   
Ariadne Papagapitos, Peacebuilding Program Director 
Valerie Rockefeller Wayne, Chair 
Current and Former Grantees 
Kosovo 
Visar Azemi Balkan Green Foundation/KOSID KOSID/Triangle Approach  
Dajana Berisha Forum for Civic Initatives  KOSID/Triangle Approach (Civil 
Society House)/Philanthropy for 
Green Ideas  
Genc Broqi  Kosovo Agency for Advocacy and 
Development  
Diversity (empowering Roma 
through education) 
Agron Demi Institute for Advanced Studies 
GAP 
Triangle Approach 
Dren Doli Group for Legal and Political 
Studies 
Triangle Approach 
Burim Ejupi Institute for Development Policy Triangle Approach 
Rinora Gojani Institute for Development Policy Triangle Approach 
Fisnik Korenica Group for Legal and Political 
Studies 
Triangle Approach 
Veton Nurkollari Dokufest  KOSID and art and culture 
Jusuf Thaci Centre for Social and 
Psychological Studies and 
Services (ENCOMPASS) 
Building civil society capacity 
Jeta Xharra Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Network 
Triangle Approach 
Edona Zogu Centre for Social and 
Psychological Studies and 
Services (ENCOMPASS) 
Building civil society capacity 
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Group Discussion in Kosovo 
Visar Azemi Balkan Green Foundation/KOSID KOSID/Triangle Approach 
Burim Ejupi Institute for Development Policy Triangle Approach 
Rinora Gojani Institute for Development Policy Triangle Approach 
Fisnik Korenica Group for Legal and Political 
Studies 
Triangle Approach 
Jeton Mehmeti Institute for Advanced Studies 
GAP 
Triangle Approach 
Kushtrim Puka FIQ 
Montenegro 
Maja Boljevic Fund for Active Citizenship Triangle Approach (Civil Society 
House)/Philanthropy for Green 
Ideas  
Vanja Calovic The Network for the Affirmation of 
the NGO Sector MANS 
Triangle Approach 
Biljana Gligoric EXPEDITIO Outside capital sustainable 
development   
Ajsa Hadzibegovic Civic Alliance Triangle Approach 
Elvira Hadzibegovic 
Bubnja 
Forum Mladi I Neformalna 
Edukacija 
Darko Ivanovic Civic Alliance Triangle Approach 
Milica Kovacevic Center for Democratic Transition Triangle Approach 
Dejan Milovac The Network for the Affirmation of 
the NGO Sector MANS 
Triangle Approach 
Tanja Rajic EXPEDITIO Outside capital sustainable 
development   
Boris Raonic Civic Alliance Triangle Approach 
Group Discussion in Montenegro 
Maja Boljevic fAKT Triangle Approach 
Ajsa Hadzibegovic Civic Alliance Triangle Approach 
Milica Kovacevic Center for Democratic Transition Triangle Approach 
Serbia 
Vukosava Crnjanski Civic Association CRTA-The 
Center for Research, 
Transparency and Accountability 
Triangle Approach 
Jelena Curuvija  Slavko Curuvija Foundation Triangle Approach; diversifying 
CSO sphere  
Biljana Dakic Djordjevic Trag Foundation Triangle Approach (Civil Society 
House)/Philanthropy for Green 
Ideas  
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Ilir Gashi Slavko Curuvija Foundation Triangle Approach; diversifying 
CSO sphere  
Dinko Gruhonjic Independent Journalists' Network 
of Vojvodina  
Outside capital investigative 
journalism  
Gordana Igric Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Regional Network 
Triangle Approach 
Natasa Kandic Humanitarian Law Center - 
Documentation and Memory 
RECOM 
Sonja Licht Belgrade Fund for Political 
Excellence  
Former grantee 
Marko Orlović Fenomena Noncapital grantee 
Jelena Milic Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies Triangle Approach 
Marija Petronijevic  Fenomena Noncapital grantee 
Maja Stojanovic  Civic Initiative Former grantee 
Vladimir Stojanovic Optimist Association Philanthropy for Green Ideas 
(non-winner); diversity and 
community engagement  
Dragana Veljovic Fenomena  Noncapital grantee 
Mladen Velojic Media and Reform Centre Nis Triangle Approach outside capital 
Dobrica Veselinovic Mikro Art 
Group Discussion in Serbia 
Vukosava Crnjanski Civic Association CRTA - The 
Center for Research, 
Transparency and Accountability 
Triangle Approach 
Biljana Dakic Djordjevic Trag Foundation Triangle Approach (Civil Society 
House)/Philanthropy for Green 
Ideas  
Ilir Gashi Slavko Curuvija Foundation 
Gordana Igric Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Regional Network 
Triangle Approach 
Mladen Velojic Media and Reform Centre Nis Triangle Approach outside capital 
Group Discussion on RECOM 
Milan Antonijevic YUCOM Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
Jelena Grujic Zvindovic Website RECOM.link 
Midhat Izmirlija Transitional Justice School and WG for creating RECOM Statute 
Natasa Kandic Humanitarian Law Center - Documentation and Memory 
Jelena Krstic Coalition for RECOM 
Maja Micic Petition for Establishing RECOM 
Sven Milekic YIHR Croatia 
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Interviews with Grantees Outside of the Western Balkans 
Kurt Bassuener Democratization 
Policy Council 
Amplifying regional voices 
and understanding context 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Lejla Bicakcic Center for 
Investigative 
Reporting 
Regional Context (BiH) Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Brendan Kenneth 
Duprey 
Regional 
Environmental Center 
for Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Regional Environmental 
Centre 
Hungary 
Juliana Hoxha  Partners Albania Philanthropy for Green Ideas Albania 
Irina Janevska ARNO Social 
Innovation Macedonia 
Philanthropy for Green Ideas Macedonia 
Matthias Puhringer Regional 
Environmental Center 
for Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Regional Environmental 
Centre 
Hungary 
Marta Szigeti Bonifert Regional 
Environmental Center 
for Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Regional Environmental 
Centre 
Hungary 
Evgenia Tairyan Representative for 
KOSID 
Washington Rep for KOSID Washington 
Bodo Weber Democratization 
Policy Council 
Amplifying regional voices 
and understanding context 
Germany 
External Interviewees 
Regional and Outside Region Perspective 
Ivana Bajrovic National Endowment for Democracy Sarajevo 
Nicola Bertolini EC Kosovo and Serbia Desk officer Brussels 
John Coequyt Sierra Club USA 
Victoria Pirker Assistant to Urlike Lunachek, Vice President of EU 
Parliament, Green MP from Austria 
Brussels 
Juraj Sevella On team of Eduard Kukan, EU Parliament, Slovak 
Socialist MP 
Brussels 
Aleksandra Toma Peace and Security Funders Group USA 
Walter Viers Charles Stewart Mott Foundation London 
Mishka Zaman World Bank Inspection Panel USA 
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Kosovo outside perspective 
Ferid Agani Minister for Spatial Planning Prishtina 
Goran Buldioski Open Society Institute   
Luljete Gjonbala USAID Mission   
Bela Luci Kosovo 2.0, think tank  
Nenad Maksimovoc Director, Center for Peace and Tolerance   
Randall Olson USAID Mission   
Dusan Radakovic Advocacy Center for Democratic Culture  
Luan Shlaku Kosovo Fund for Open Society Prishtina 
Ardita Zejnullahu Association of Independent Electronic Media of Kosovo  
Montenegro outside perspective  
Bix Aliu DCM at U.S. Embassy   
Romain Boitard EU Delegation   
Dragutin Drago Dekovic City Manager, Podgorica   
Ana Drakic Former USAID   
Jelena Janjusevic UNDP   
Ivan Kuzminovic Norwegian Embassy Belgrade 
Misela Manojlovic Local Self-Government Secretariat, Podgorica   
Boris Mugosa Deputy Mayor of Podgorica   
Aleksandar Sime Dedovic ALPHA Centre  
Marija Vucinovic Minister Without Portfolio   
Bosiljka Vukovic Simonovic Head of the Division for Climate Change and Air Quality 
at Ministry of Sustainable Development and Tourism 
 
Serbia Outside Perspective 
Sonja Biserko Helsinki Committee for Human Rights   
Petar Blagojevic Juzne Vesti  
Ivana Cirkovic Former Office for Cooperation with Civil Society   
Ana Firtel Foreign Investment Council   
Paola Petric Heinrich Böll Foundation   
Yolanda San Hose EU Delegation   
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Appendix D: Additional Data on the Trag Foundation 
Regranting 
The following table summarizes the funds that Trag receives for regranting to other organizations. 
Donor (funding cycle) 2010 (USD) 2011 (USD) 2012 (USD) 2013 (USD) 2014 (USD) 
CNF (2005-2012) $491,533.38 $521,721.88 $441,235.85 $8,394.29 N/A 
Mott (2004 onward) $28,391.38 $38,187.42 $27,138.44 N/A $1,715.59 
BTD ((2004 onward) $16,686.78 $17,275.14 $21,488.32 $10,950.57 $80,319.54 
USAID-ISC (2006-
2014) 
$186,751.20 $148,508.38 $62,074.23 $284,560.56 $418,705.53 
USAID (2014 onward) N/A N/A N/A N/A $114,918.50 
EU (2013 onward) N/A N/A N/A $297,203.21 $11,904.75 
UNICEF (2012-2013) N/A N/A $63,991.44 $7,345.59 N/A 
ERSTE (2006-2014) $27,474.02 $35,441.13 $30,322.36 $29,031.59 $1,734.46 
Other donors $150,528.37 
(DFID alone 
143,528.36) 
$51,791.83 $100,175.85 
 
$10,565.29 $29,269.11 
Data on Trag local fundraising 
2010 – $61,217.75 (corporate donors such as ERSTE, Telenor, Coca-Cola, Asus, State Lottery) 
2011 – $50,558.94 (ERSTE, Tech, UGO-V, etc.) 
2012 – $61,166.13  
2013 – N/A  
2014 – $237,855.08 + $20,465.20 (raised for floods relief) + $35,379.15 (for Endowment Fund) 
2015 – $51,365.91 + $14,914.84 (raised for Endowment Fund) 
Local fundraising done by the grassroot CSOs TRAG supports: 
2010 – $8,506.87 (SF program – 7 CSOs) 
2011 – $32,627 (VIA program – 9 CSOs) 
2012 – $27,203 (SF program – 7 CSOs) 
2013 – $5,035 (SF program – 1 CSO) 
2014 – $172,430 (SF program / 2 rounds; SA and PPP – 36 CSOs) 
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